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Since Varela (1996) first introduced the term ‘neurophenomenology’, the assimilation 
of neuroscientific and phenomenological forms of evidence has become increasingly 
prominent in the cognitive sciences. Over the past quarter-century, 
neurophenomenological approaches have facilitated several notable successes and 
have been increasingly utilised to tackle a myriad of theoretical and methodological 
problems. However, an oft-voiced and persisting concern pertains to the prospective 
incongruity of combining objective, third-person forms of evidence with first-person, 
so-called ‘subjective’ forms of evidence. According to some critics (Ryle 1949; 
Dennett 1991; Hardcastle 1996), the inclusion of phenomenological and therefore 
subjective, biased, and anecdotal first-person accounts of experience and cognition 
are of little utility or compatibility with a ‘hard science’ such as neuroscience. 
Furthermore, the kind of research initiatives that are labelled as 
‘neurophenomenological’ are surprisingly heterogenous and, on examination, the 
logic governing each methodological approach is not necessarily interchangeable. 
Thus far, little scholarly attention has been paid to disaggregating and defining the 
diverse standards of evidence and validation operative in neurophenomenological 
research programmes, and how they might differently overcome the problem of 
integrating ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ forms of evidence.  
To address this lacuna in the current scholarship, I propose the existence of three 
identifiable sub-categories of neurophenomenological research: 1. Interpretative 
Neurophenomenology; 2. Experimental Neurophenomenology; 3. Constitutive 
Neurophenomenology. After articulating the defining characteristics of each 
neurophenomenological approach, I examine how each confronts the problem of 
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establishing and validating its claims. I achieve this by evaluating three exemplary 
instances of past neurophenomenological research. Thereafter, I analyse the kinds 
of theoretical implications that can be extracted from each case example and how 
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I. Varela’s Neurophenomenology 
The term ‘neurophenomenology’ was inaugurated in Varela’s (1996) essay: 
“Neurophenomenology, A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem”. Ostensibly 
formulated in reaction to Chalmers’ (1995) then-recent articulation of the “hard 
problem of consciousness”, Varela’s proposed solution was not explicitly wedded to 
resolving the conflict between mind and brain as Chalmers conceived it. For Varela, 
to sharply juxtapose ‘physicality’ and ‘mentality’ would simply perpetuate the flawed 
conceptual presuppositions that he wished to overturn.  
Instead, Varela aimed to ignite a foundational transformation in the way certain types 
of neuroscientific research are conducted and their findings are philosophically 
grounded. Varela argues that the ‘problem’ troubling Chalmers (and others) is 
categorically unsolvable through discovering some as-yet-undetermined empirical 
correlation or an undiscovered neural region. Thus, in absolving neuroscience of its 
Cartesian residuals, included therein must be any revitalised search for a 
contemporary equivalent to the pineal gland, a neural region that can somehow 
‘connect’ psyche and body.  
Instead, Varela hypothesised that the emergence of the ‘hard problem’ reflected a 
methodological blind-spot in the neurosciences; specifically, that neuroscience 
lacked possession of a focused methodology appropriate for integrating structural 
accounts of ‘first-person’ experience. In response, Varela advances an approach 
“armed with pragmatic tools enabling [the development of] a science of 
consciousness [to] move beyond the hard problem”. Crucially, Varela’s remedy aims 
to “marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to experience”, with 
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the latter role to be explicitly provided by or informed by the phenomenological 
tradition. By following this formula, Varela suggests, the ‘hard problem’ is unmasked 
as a pseudo-problem and, in its place, we obtain an implementable way of credibly 
linking the domains of brain and experience from the ground-up.  
Guiding the neurophenomenological enterprise is the proposition that brain and 
experience each share a status of “irreducibility”. That is, Varela believes that both 
experiential and neural phenomena are inextricably entwined, yet, simultaneously, 
both are seemingly structured according to their own, semi-autonomous logic. 
Accordingly, as neither dimension can be assiduously reduced to the other, neither 
dimension is eliminable for any comprehensive account of mind. Furthermore, so-
called ‘first-person data’ is already seen as a crucial determinant in the evaluation of 
neuroscientific evidence.  
Indeed, as Price and Aydede, (2005) suggest, both physical and emotional pain 
recruit the brain area known as the anterior cingulate gyrus; to further investigate the 
degree of similarity or difference between these two ‘pain’ phenomena, we might 
pivot to their manifestation in lived experience. Similarly, Rudrauf et al. (2003) 
illustrate the incoherence of seeking to eliminate the ‘subjective-experiential’ domain 
during the process of explanation, despite treating this domain as an explanandum. 
However, Varela implies that many of the investigative tools employed to describe 
experience in neuroscientific research are somewhat ‘blunt’, particularly when the 
researcher must turn away from reflective cognition (and its neural correlates) to the 
less transparent domain of prereflective experience. Even where accounts of 
experience successfully demonstrate explanatory utility, Varela suggests that their 
terminological employments are often descriptively impoverished: “what is missing is 
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not the coherent nature of the explanation but its alienation from human life”. In 
parallel, neuroscience’s ever-expanding compendium of empirical discoveries, while 
not invalidating ‘qualitative’ approaches to mind, cannot be overlooked by them 
either. Thus, Varela argues in favour of employing a systematic methodology to 
investigate and catalogue experiential phenomena that will mirror the methodological 
rigour with which neuroscientists investigate the brain. In an optimal scenario, these 
dual forms of investigation should not compete with one another for explanatory 
dominance but coalesce into a singular, “mutually illuminating” conceptual 
framework.  
To further elucidate why Varela believes that both neurological and experiential 
evidence are “irreducible” for any comprehensive study of the mind, we should briefly 
review how they intersect on a theoretical, practical and institutional plane. 
Substantiating Varela’s position will require a cursory assessment of the points of 
convergence that exist between phenomenology and neuroscience as well as a 
glance at where exploitable opportunities and potential conflicts may arise.  
II. Who Should Study the Mind? Neuroscience, Philosophy and 
Cognitive Science 
Arguably, neuroscience often finds itself situated on a border between the natural 
and the social sciences; perhaps a third point of convergence should include the 
‘humanities’ also. Like many borders, that between the natural sciences, social 
sciences and humanities have been subject to historical disputes of ownership, 
repeated attempts at reunification and the annexation of lost territory. Recently, the 
interdisciplinary field of cognitive science has assumed the duty of integrating these 
heterogenous disciplines into a coherent account of mind by focusing on clear zones 
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of mutual interest: i.e., language, movement, sociality, self-consciousness and so 
forth. Neurophenomenology represents one such effort at constructing a unificatory 
sub-discipline that seemingly straddles this interdisciplinary border, recruiting 
evidence from across disciplines towards a defined research goal. 
Why might adopting a cross-disciplinary methodology be necessary for 
neuroscience? The brain, as an entity made up of organic matter, weighable and 
measurable like any extended object, is straight-forwardly amenable to the ‘hard’ 
scientific investigations of biology, physics, and chemistry. Indeed, ‘neurobiology, 
‘psychophysics’ and ‘neurochemistry’ all represent lively sub-fields of neuroscientific 
investigation. Furthermore, just like any internal organ, the brain can be studied, 
mapped and even manipulated with sophisticated imaging technology and surgical 
techniques. Yet, any comprehensive methodology seeking to tackle the functioning 
of this organ motivates a conceptual shift into the purview of the humanities and 
social sciences.1 Due to its close intimacy with the more abstract (and contested) 
domain of consciousness, acquiring knowledge of the brain’s complexities often 
demands an equally sophisticated inquiry into human thought, emotion, 
communication, and so forth.  
Supposedly, phenomenology represents an appropriate method for interrogating 
such domains which, as discussed, are frequently treated as indispensable items of 
evidence in neuroscientific studies. Phenomenology thus affords a systematic 
methodology designed around revealing experiential structures that, while 
neuroscience readily admits are crucial to interpreting its findings, may occasionally 
lack the requisite tools to do so. Furthermore, neurophenomenology is well-situated 
 
1 Though it is important to note that neurophenomenology is not a functionalist approach to mind. 
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within a broader, on-going dialogue between philosophy and neuroscience, whereby 
recent decades have witnessed theoretical neuroscience continually breach a level 
of conceptual complexity as to inevitably brush up against philosophical problems. 
Indeed, there has been a renaissance of interest in philosophical problems freshly 
approached from a neuroscientific standpoint in which neurophenomenology may 
have important things to say.  
In part, neuroscience’s growing receptivity to philosophical modes of analysis is 
motivated by the lightning pace at which its research findings accumulate, a pace 
which often exceeds researchers’ abilities to cement a cohesive theoretical 
framework. As Thompson (2006) illustrates, though cognitive science is 
“institutionally well-established, it is not a theoretically settled ‘Weld’” as compared 
with other disciplines. Indeed, the magnitude of neuroscientific discoveries, along 
with their sometimes counter-intuitive implications, frequently heighten 
neuroscience’s receptivity to philosophical examinations of its evidence.  
As the empirical evidence frequently points toward a need to define or fundamentally 
reconceptualise complex conceptual notions (including the definition of ‘mind’ itself), 
the road is thus paved for philosophical contribution, with several neuroscientists 
having cited phenomenology as the form of philosophy most conducive with their 
discipline’s demands (Iacoboni 2006; Cole 2008; Gallese 2011).  
III. The Neurophenomenological Enterprise 
At this juncture, it is helpful to briefly articulate some of the more general, positive 
positions that characterise neurophenomenology as a methodology. Firstly, the 
neurophenomenologist is likely to emphasise that reporting the first-person 
dimension in ordinary language or borrowing terminology from hard scientific 
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disciplines such as physics, may not be congruent with the task’s requirements. 
Additionally, neurophenomenologists posit that phenomenological descriptions 
should, ideally, provide more than just contingent information regarding a subject’s 
individual psychological character. Rather, neurophenomenology should aim to 
reveal invariant structures of consciousness so that it is better aligned with 
neuroscience’s aim of revealing invariant neurophysiological structures. Of related 
epistemological relevance here is the phenomenology-derived notion of the ‘un-
concealment of experience’. This notion holds that phenomenal experience is an 
existent, discoverable facet of the world, amenable to accurate reportage and peer 
review, provided the conceptual tools are right for the job: 
We are convinced by empirical and intuitive evidence that our human experience follows 
some fundamental structural principle which, like space, enforces the nature of what is 
given to us as contents of that experience (Varela, 1996). 
Indeed, even if Husserl’s conviction that phenomenology discloses ‘essences’ is 
suspended, integrating phenomenology with neuroscience may nevertheless help to 
disclose replicable phenomenological profiles that can reliably map onto 
corresponding patterns of neural activity or neurobiological phenotypes. For 
example, a neurological profile common to those diagnosed with schizophrenia could 
potentially be mapped onto a co-occurring phenomenological profile.  
Therefore, theoretically, and methodologically, neurophenomenology echoes 
Husserl’s strategy of defining the structures of experience through revealing their 
essential characteristics. Furthermore, as will be discussed, several instantiations of 
neurophenomenological research simultaneously echo Heidegger’s emphasis on 
conceiving the agent as situated in a network of contextual meaning alongside 
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Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on embodiment and the compatibility between 
phenomenological analysis and psychological research findings. 
One further caveat of note is that neurophenomenology must retain some loyalty to 
its parent disciplines. A threshold can be passed at which point 
neurophenomenology resembles neither neuroscience nor phenomenology; as such, 
neurophenomenology must carefully navigate the conventions, terminological 
employments and evidential criteria of each discipline, making informed and cautious 
compromises when necessary. For instance, if a purportedly 
neurophenomenological approach makes unqualified usage of ‘action 
representations’, the phenomenologist’s suspicion may be aroused. Simultaneously, 
neurophenomenology must adhere to the principles of validity and reliability integral 
to good scientific practice, particularly if its claims are to be supported by empirical 
evidence. Speculations that stray too far from the empirical evidence will not survive 
the ‘Occam’s razor’ wielded by science; in this sense, neurophenomenology may be 
encumbered by constraints that phenomenology is not.  
Therefore, if Varela is correct, neurophenomenology is capable of adhering to the 
customs of scientific validity (“are we accurately identifying the particular experience 
we intend to identify?”) and reliability (“will other researchers replicate these 
results?”) while retaining a degree of autonomy in its philosophical assumptions and 
methodological outlook. If both neural and phenomenal properties are ‘objectively’ 
discoverable, and brain and experience are intimately interconnected, perhaps both 
can be accurately revealed in dialogue with each other.  
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that the onus must be placed on 
neurophenomenology to justify its existence as a distinct sub-discipline. Evaluators 
12 
 
and adopters of neurophenomenology must continually question themselves as to 
what precisely is gained from neurophenomenology that would not be otherwise 
achievable with an alternative neuroscientific approach, or from each discipline 
operating independently.  
However, that neurophenomenology synthesises the disciplines of neuroscience and 
phenomenology into a singular account does not necessarily enlighten us as to how 
this synthesis should be practically implemented, or which research problems it 
should focus its efforts towards. To date, little work has been conducted toward 
establishing a taxonomy of the somewhat heterogenous neurophenomenological 
approaches currently in use. 
Our present concern pertains to how the disciplines of neuroscience and 
phenomenology might be viably synthesised on a systematic basis and how the 
products of such a synthesis should seek to evidence their claims. Thus, we return to 
the central question of exactly what constitutes a ‘neurophenomenological 
approach’. Using Varela’s (1996) dictum that neurophenomenology operationalises 
the “mutual constraints and illumination” provided by neuroscience and 
phenomenology, the moniker ‘neurophenomenology’, can be applied both broadly 
and retroactively to a variety of research programmes.  
There is currently an assortment of methods that fit the bill. For instance, Ratcliffe 
(2002) argues that the neuropsychology of emotion is conceptually augmented via 
Heidegger’s notions of mood and attunement. Gallagher and Cole (1995) offer an 
innovative phenomenological reading of a neuropsychological patient, which echoes 
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an even earlier methodological approach pioneered by Merleau-Ponty (1945).2  By 
contrast, several authors take for granted that neurophenomenology designates a 
specific experimental protocol designed for generating specific forms of data. Indeed, 
despite Varela’s (1996) insinuation that neurophenomenology designates a specific 
experimental procedure in his original essay, his later work (1999a; 1999b) negates 
this narrower interpretation. Actually, Varela’s (1996) initial formulation of the 
neurophenomenological programme contained the nascent form of each type of 
neurophenomenological method identified below.  
As such, we will utilise ‘Varela’s dictum’ (the proclaimed mutual co-dependency of 
phenomenology and neuroscience) as our guiding classificatory principle. Employing 
this classification, there exist three major, identifiable approaches to 
neurophenomenological research, past and present: (1) Interpretative 
Neurophenomenology (I-NP); (2) Experimental Neurophenomenology (E-NP); 
(3) Constitutive Neurophenomenology (C-NP). 
1. Interpretative neurophenomenology grounds and expounds existing empirical 
results taken from the neurosciences within a phenomenological framework of 
interpretation. Historically, this approach may have been adopted when dominant 
interpretative frameworks (i.e., behaviourism or cognitivism) failed to capture an 
essential piece of the conceptual puzzle or convincingly relay the ‘cognitive-
experiential correlate’ to a study’s neurological discovery. To explicate the logic 
driving this approach, we will utilise Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) phenomenology of 
 
2 Indeed, if neurophenomenology designates any systematic practice that dynamically integrates the 
study of experience with the study of the brain, its inception can be traced as far back as Merleau-
Ponty’s (1945) Phenomenology of Perception. 
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motor-intentionality and his interpretation of a well-known neuropsychological case 
study provided by Goldstein & Gelb (1918;1921). 
2. Experimental neurophenomenology is closer to a standard (neuro)scientific 
experimental protocol in that it seeks to generate novel datasets in a laboratory 
setting, from which it then draws conclusions. Crucial to this instantiation of 
neurophenomenology is that the experiment must produce neurological and 
phenomenological data in tandem. ‘Neurological’ and ‘phenomenological’ datasets 
are produced using separate measurement tools but, for the experiment to be 
deemed successful, both datasets must display a robust correlation between each 
other. This approach will be explored by analysing Petitmengin’s (2009) meta-
review, which draws on several years of experimental neurophenomenological 
research on epilepsy.  
3. Constitutive neurophenomenology emphasises the wide-scale integration of 
various findings from the neuroscientific and phenomenological literature, 
predominantly for the purpose of illuminating a broadly defined ‘construct’ or 
‘cognitive domain’. This instantiation of neurophenomenology departs from 
examining or producing a single dataset or case study and instead aims to formulate 
an integrative model of a delineated ‘cognitive domain’ (e.g., agency, spatiality, 
memory, etc.). Accordingly, constitutive neurophenomenology aims to showcase 
how a cognitive domain is fundamentally constituted according to its invariant 
phenomenological and neurophysiological characteristics. From this, researchers 
can extract an operational definition of the domain studied that may also be of utility 
to other clinical or experimental protocols. To understand this approach’s internal 
logic, we will evaluate a broad and on-going research programme that integrates 
mirror neuron research with phenomenological accounts of empathy. 
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In what follows, we will assess each of the neurophenomenological approaches 
outlined above through an in-depth examination of three exemplary research 
programmes representative of their category. From this, we should expect to achieve 
greater clarity regarding the internal logic that guides each approach, which 
obstacles they may have to overcome and what standard of proof they should aim to 
attain. Thereafter, we intend to extract guiding principles from each exemplar to 
provide a roadmap for future researchers wishing to adopt a neurophenomenological 
methodology. While the programmatic provided here will not be exhaustive, 
cataloguing the different instantiations of neurophenomenological research, and the 
heterogenous evidential criterium that structure them, is a timely contribution to the 
wider neurophenomenological enterprise that has apparently proven itself a 
















Not only is Merleau-Ponty perceived as a something of a canonical 
phenomenologist, he represents one of the earliest figures to productively synthesise 
phenomenological and (neuro)scientific research findings. In pursuit of this goal, 
Merleau-Ponty showcases how, by focusing on areas of mutual interest, 
phenomenological inquiry and empirical investigation can mutually inform one 
another. Indeed, in his magnus opus Phenomenology of Perception (PoP) 
(1945/2012), Merleau-Ponty frequently extends Heidegger’s phenomenological 
assault on Cartesian metaphysics to include the fields of neurology, physiology and 
psychology, confidently claiming: “the psycho-physical event can no longer be 
conceived in the manner of Cartesian physiology” (118). Crucially, ‘Cartesian 
physiology’ does not denote Descartes’ strictly physiological work, but the Cartesian 
doctrine of substance dualism: 
the union of the soul and body is not established through arbitrary decree that unites two 
mutually exclusive terms – it is accomplished at each moment in the movement of 
existence (118). 
From this statement, we learn that Merleau-Ponty’s occasional term for ‘mind’ or 
‘consciousness’ - the psycho-physical event3 - is incompatible with Cartesian 
dualism. However, for Merleau-Ponty, this does not rule out the possibility that a 
philosophical investigation into ‘consciousness’ (the ‘psycho-physical event’) can 
incorporate evidence from the sciences. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty frequently presents 
 
3 A coinage developed by Husserl in Ideas II. 
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his phenomenological work with one foot in the biological and human sciences, as 
evidenced by the importance he bestows to biology, physiology, psychiatry, and 
neurology, frequently drawing on such disciplines in support of a claim being made.  
However, of primary interest for our purposes is the way in which Merleau-Ponty 
occasionally replicates the fundamental investigative logic operative in fields such as 
neuropsychology and, more specifically, how the introduction of phenomenological 
resources can inform the interpretation of neuropsychological research findings. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty offers what is perhaps the first template through which 
empirical findings in the neurosciences are illuminated with recourse to 
phenomenology (and vice versa), a proto-example of the principle of ‘mutual 
circulation’ subsequently identified by Varela (1996).  
As perhaps the earliest adopter of a neurophenomenological approach, Merleau-
Ponty is a fitting first choice to analyse here. In what follows, we will evaluate how 
Merleau-Ponty’s interpretative neurophenomenology (I-NP) elucidates both a 
(neuro)psychological construct and a neuropsychological case study through the 
provision of a phenomenology-derived interpretative framework. Additionally, we will 
examine how this same investigation showcases how phenomenological inquiry can 
be developed in dialogue with empirical findings.  
II. Merleau-Ponty’s Neurophenomenological Method 
Merleau-Ponty seeks to examine the so-called ‘psycho-physical event’ with an 
investigative technique analogous to that of neuropsychology; namely, Merleau-
Ponty seemingly believes that functionality can be inferred from analysing 
dysfunction. Merleau-Ponty routinely employs this logic whenever expounding a 
selected phenomenon (e.g., ‘sensation’), contrasting normative with pathological 
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manifestations of the phenomenon under scrutiny, investigating the ‘normal’ through 
the path opened up by the ‘abnormal’. Crucially, Merleau-Ponty’s criterion for 
‘abnormal’ rarely makes use of the hypothetical. Instead, he borrows examples 
directly from the clinical literature, frequently employing medically accepted 
definitions of neurological disorders without adjustment.  
Indeed, for both neuropsychology and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, extracting 
inferences from pathology serves a pragmatic necessity. The relationship between 
mind and brain (neuropsychology) and self and world (phenomenology) are complex, 
often eluding straightforward, common-sensical analysis. Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty 
is wont to show, integrating both accounts into a single analysis can help evidence 
claims made in the other. Moreover, neuropsychology itself is not a science like 
chemistry or physics because the ‘first-person dimension’ is always included at the 
forefront of the investigation. Accordingly, developments in neuropsychology rarely 
stem from ‘purely’ physiological findings and instead depend somewhat on 
researcher’s abilities to accurately ‘capture’ cognition-experience via a careful 
description of its intricacies, a role that, in principle, can be fulfilled by 
phenomenology. 
Because Merleau-Ponty emphasises that the patient represents a way of being in 
their own right, a distinct ‘opening onto the world’, the clinical case study represents 
an invaluable resource. The patient’s ‘opening onto the world’ is not a thought 
experiment, nor is its nature easily replicated in the experimental setting. 
Correspondingly, Merleau-Ponty recognises that the detail-rich, 
neuropsychopathological case study offers a valuable window to witnessing the self-
world dynamic in an atypical configuration in a way that simultaneously provides a 
qualitative depth frequently absent in experimental and statistical analyses.  
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The notion that neuropsychopathology offers a window into an otherwise opaque 
phenomenon is reminiscent of Heidegger’s notion of breakdown. Breakdown 
emerges when an otherwise opaque facet of absorbed coping becomes temporarily 
blatant because of a ‘break’ in its regular seamlessness. In neuropsychology, 
‘breakdown’ helps to showcase the function of a neural region whereby the detection 
of a localised lesion (e.g., the hippocampus) enables researchers to infer the 
purpose of that region (e.g., memory) through observing where cognitive-experiential 
deficits manifest. 
For example, Ellis et al. (1992) distinguish between two kinds of semantic deafness: 
pure word deafness (when the patient hears all sounds normally except for words) 
and word form deafness (where the expression of words are heard but manifest as 
uninterpretable distortions). A breakdown in one of these components imply both are 
necessary for regular word comprehension. In another study, Anderson, Damasio 
and Damasio (1990) describe a patient who lost the ability to read and write letters 
and words but who retained an excellent number-processing ability. The patient 
could read, write and calculate numbers with ease only if a number was written as a 
numeral (‘11’) but not as text (‘eleven’).  
Neuropsychologists designate such symptoms: ‘double disassociations’; that is, a 
behaviour usually conceived of as a seamless ‘whole’ (semantic comprehension, 
mathematical ability) is discovered to be constituted by several dissociable 
components. That each cognitive-behavioural act is genuinely distinct is bolstered by 
the fact that one is retained while the other is lost, often causing the agent to adopt 
compensatory strategies. For this reason, Marshall and Gurd (2010) state that the 
field of neuropsychology is “heavily dependent on theoretical innovation”. Taken by 
themselves, observations of abnormal behaviour yield little information. However, 
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when interpreting the double disassociation, the interpreter must ask: which hidden 
factor will distinguish between these behaviours? Merleau-Ponty suggests that, at 
least in some instances, phenomenology can help make the distinguishing factor 
more transparent to investigation by showcasing how “compensatory strategies 
observed in pathological cases” shed light on the “fundamental features of our 
existence” (Jensen 2009). 
From a neuropsychological perspective, double disassociations imply that different 
neurocognitive sub-systems facilitate different cognitive-behavioural acts. While 
Merleau-Ponty may not conceptualise the mind as constituted by ‘neurocognitive 
systems’, he does believe that correctly interpreting double disassociations will 
enhance a phenomenological understanding of ‘mind’ and, in turn, differentiating 
between phenomenological-intentional structures renders the dissociation itself more 
conceptually transparent.  
Thus, Merleau-Ponty intends to demonstrate how an impoverished understanding of 
intentionality and the importance of global context hinders (classical) 
neuropsychology’s ability to interpret the richness of its own findings. Furthermore, 
Merleau-Ponty aims to demonstrate how pathological experiences illuminate the 
general structure of the organism’s embodied interrelationship with its world, 
whereby clinical deviations in this relationship can explicate its general form. Thus, 
we should be attentive to how Merleau-Ponty utilises the phenomenological method 
and empirical evidence in developing his account.  
III. Phenomenological Interpretation of the Body Schema 
Chapter 3 of PoP: ‘The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motoricity’ (pp. 127-212) 
exemplifies Merleau-Ponty’s interpretative neurophenomenological approach. 
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Throughout, Merleau-Ponty assesses material from empirical neuropsychology via 
the conceptual prism of phenomenological philosophy. Merleau-Ponty first attempts 
a reconceptualisation of the so-called ‘body schema’, a notion that conceptually 
grounds the subsequent case study. The notion of body schema originated in Head 
and Holmes (1911), where it was defined as a non-conscious postural model. As 
Merleau-Ponty notes, the construct emerged from analyses of neuropsychological 
disorder such as allochiria, meaning that ‘body schema’ is best defined as a 
psychological concept derived from neuropsychological research. 
The task taken up by both psychologists and Merleau-Ponty is that of adequately 
defining the body schema, primarily through argumentation. Merleau-Ponty opens 
with a general account of embodiment that hinges upon the conceiving the body as a 
primary, invariant reference point for being-in-the-world: 
If my arm is resting on the table, I never think to say that it is next to the ashtray in the 
same way that the ashtray is next to the telephone. The contour of my body is a border 
that ordinary spatial relations do not cross. (127) 
One’s arm is not ‘next to the ashtray’ because it is never viewed from the vantage 
point of a detached intelligence that perceives it as one object among many in the 
visual field. Moreover, the perception of the ashtray is already influenced by my 
having an arm: by virtue of my arm, the ashtray is presented to me as a useful, 
graspable, for-something. Positioning his definition against rival interpretations, 
Merleau-Ponty then critically assesses what he sees as two competing hypotheses 
of the body schema. Firstly, he critiques the ‘empiricist’ interpretation, which might 
also be deemed ‘behaviourist’: 
the body schema was thought to develop gradually through childhood [to the] extent that 
tactile, kinaesthetic and articular contents associated between themselves or with 
themselves and were thereby recalled more easily (129). 
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‘Recalled’ is an especially questionable term because it places the intellect centre-
stage as the entity that recalls previous associations, the contours of which “develop 
through childhood” because the empirical associations strengthen over time. 
Merleau-Ponty firmly disputes that body schema is subordinate to the intellect or that 
the body schema is an emergent property of a ‘sewing-together’ of sensory 
modalities, which implies that the mind exists as superordinate to the body.  
Subsequently, Merleau-Ponty assesses an alternative hypothesis, which, although 
no longer conceives of the body schema as “the result of mere associations”, still 
fails to capture the phenomenon in full. This second hypothesis posits the body 
schema as the “global awareness of my posture in the inter-sensory world, a ‘form’ in 
Gestalt psychology’s sense of the word” (129). Despite a general affinity with Gestalt 
psychology, Merleau-Ponty believes that a phenomenology of the body schema 
highlights a vital piece of the conceptual puzzle that the Gestaltist glosses over. Like 
the empiricist, the Gestaltist presumes that the body schema’s form is largely static 
and constrained to the material body’s boundaries, whereas: “the body schema is 
neither the simple copy nor the global awareness of the parts of the body […] rather, 
the subject actively integrates the parts according to the organism’s projects” 
[emphasis added] (130).  
After departing from the erroneous conceptions of the body schema that interpret it 
as an empirical association of sensory input or a static awareness of position, 
Merleau-Ponty forwards a phenomenological interpretation. On this account, the 
body schema’s form is continuously sculpted in relation to the worldly projects that 
solicit the agent. Merleau-Ponty emphasises that the embodied agent intersects with 
external world through (or as) the bodily schematic, arguing “bodily space and 
external space form a practical system”, the enactive element of which is particularly 
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evident when “considering the body in motion because movement is not content with 
passively undergoing space and time” (132).  
Notably, because the body schema is a dynamic phenomenon, it never accentuates 
all parts of the schematic equally. Thus, our embodied motoricity and spatiality are 
situational instead of merely positional; the body does not merely occupy a place in 
geometric space, nor does it passively receive and store sensory input. Instead, our 
situationally-driven comportment, elicited by environmental tasks, moulds the body 
schema according to the task’s demands, establishing a dyadic harmony between 
body and world. For example, as I type, the parts of my body not orientated toward 
the goal of writing temporarily rescind (without disappearing entirely) from my bodily-
motor schematic. If another body part(s) could replace my hands and achieve the 
same goal, it might assume an equivalent signification. Moreover, upon perceiving 
the keyboard, it automatically offers the affordance of something for-writing, which 
(re)shapes my body schema. Body schema is therefore eminently plastic and 
situational and, like perception, is best understood in conjunction with its intentional-
directedness. Thus, Merleau-Ponty summarises his interpretation by stating: “body 
schema is, in the end, a manner of expressing that my body is in and toward the 
world” (130). 
Thus, the concept ‘body schema’, first supplied by neuropsychology and then refined 
and reformulated by subsequent psychologists, is further elucidated through the 
phenomenological lens. Knowingly or not, Merleau-Pont essentially operates as a 
phenomenologically-orientated psychologist; that is, he presents an established 
psychological concept, assesses rival definitions of it, and discards those which (he 
believes) fail to define it adequately before providing his own account. For the 
neuropsychologist, the model most deserving of loyalty is the one most capable of 
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the explaining the construct in a satisfactorily way, and Merleau-Ponty’s account is 
acceptable to the extent that it can demonstrably cohere with the construct in 
question.  
In sum, a phenomenological interpretation of the body schema conceives it as 
neither a bundle of impressions nor a self-contained system isolated from global 
context. Merleau-Ponty claims that both the empiricist and the Gestalt account failed 
to distinguish between the ‘lived’ and ‘objective’ body by underemphasising how the 
schema is formed according to situational demands and environmental solicitations. 
Only after conducting a phenomenological interpretation do two crucial factors 
become perceptible: 1) that the body schema is not subordinate to reflective 
consciousness;4 2) that it epitomises a dynamic interrelationship between self and 
world, the shape of which is sculpted according to the tasks that the agent is 
engaged in. 
IV. Merleau-Ponty as Neuropsychologist 
Let us now turn to the more difficult task Merleau-Ponty sets himself, the application 
of the phenomenological lens to a neuropsychological case study. After detailing 
how a phenomenological interpretation augments an operational definition of the 
body schema, he progresses onto a lengthy analysis of body schema in ‘breakdown’. 
To achieve this, Merleau-Ponty reinterprets Goldstein and Gelb’s (1918; 1923) 
classic case study on patient ‘Schneider’, a WW1 veteran who suffered from a 
shrapnel-induced brain injury located to his occipital lobe and occipital-parietal 
junction (Mahrotta & Behrman 2004).  
 
4 Dreyfus (2007a) argues that, when engaged in worldly tasks, anything resembling consciousness or 
subjectivity dissolves completely. 
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As discussed, neuropsychological theories are established by astutely inferring 
cognitive function from cases of pathology, typically those engendered by brain 
lesions. Abnormalities in the patient’s comportment, if interpreted correctly, help to 
build a more fine-grained picture of the relation between mind and brain that is 
otherwise concealed in the non-clinical agent’s everyday cognitive functioning. In his 
phenomenological interpretation of Schneider, Merleau-Ponty mirrors this logic, 
asserting: “let us examine closely a case of morbid motricity that lays bare the 
fundamental relations between the body and space” (133).  
Thus, Merleau-Ponty suggests that a sophisticated account of motor-intentional 
dysfunction can shed light on the phenomenon of motor-intentionality generally. 
Because the blueprint for Merleau-Ponty’s investigative schematic resembles that of 
any other neuropsychological interpretation, the patient’s symptomatology is placed 
centre-stage while Merleau-Ponty’s analysis works backwards from its concrete, 
empirical actuality.  
Under a contemporary classification, Schneider’s symptoms are listed as: allochiria 
(mis-localisation of sensory stimuli), autotopagnosia (mis-localisation of body parts), 
apperceptive agnosia (perceptual defects) and integrative agnosia, (the ability to 
perceive parts but not integrate them into wholes) (Marotta and Behrmann (2004). 
As is customary in neuropsychology, both a ‘third-person’ and ‘first-person’ 
dimension to the deficit are used to evidence the diagnosis, i.e., the patient’s self-
reported experiences and observed cognitive-behaivoural pathologies classify a 
disorder and determine its diagnosis. Merleau-Ponty therefore inherits from 
Gelb/Goldstein the dual apparatuses (observable behaviour and patient self-report) 
requisite for formulating a neuropsychological theory. This incorporation of third-
person resources is a proto-example of a methodology Dennett (1991) will later call 
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‘heterophenomenology’, which he argues bypasses phenomenology’s alleged 
epistemological weaknesses by appeal to publicly-available data. 
Which of Schneider’s symptoms invite a theoretical explanation? Notably, Schneider 
cannot point to any part of his body on command nor follow new instructions. Yet, 
bizarrely, he is fully capable of bringing his hand to the same body-part, or even 
perform a variety of complex actions, if performing a goal-directed action that 
constituted part of his previous behavioural repertoire. At various points, Goldstein 
and Gelb categorised these interrelated disassociations into two paired categories. 
We will first assess the disassociation between pointing vs. grasping behaviours, 
introduced in Goldstein (1931). However, this dissociation was seen as a particular 
case of a more general dissociation (Jensen 2009) between concrete vs. abstract 
movement (Goldstein and Gelb 1918). Merleau-Ponty interprets both in his analysis, 
though sometimes with little signposting as to which. 
Clarifying these proposed double disassociations (‘pointing and grasping’ and 
‘abstract and concrete movement’) will be augmented by including their 
phenomenological profiles into the interpretative fold. If Merleau-Ponty’s I-NP is 
successful, neuropsychology gains an alternative framework with which to 
comprehend Schneider’s aberrant speech and actions. Simultaneously, if Merleau-
Ponty’s own phenomenological account successfully finds support in the empirical 
evidence, we might better justify the claim that I-NP can generate something 
approximating a neuropsychological theory. 
V.i Analysis of Schneider I: Pointing and Grasping 
As an interpretive tool, Merleau-Ponty believes that greater attention should be paid 
to the intentional structure of Schneider’s actions (or inactions). Correctly interpreting 
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Schneider’s symptoms is greatly impoverished, Merleau-Ponty believes, if one 
possesses only a shallow account of their intentional profile(s). Indeed, intentionality 
is apparently so pivotal to Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation that he claims: “if a being is 
consciousness, it must be nothing other than a fabric of intentions” (153). How then 
might, on Merleau-Ponty’s account, revealing this fabric’s intricate structure shed 
light on the Schneider case?  
Merleau-Ponty states that because “the same subject incapable of pointing to a body 
part” can still touch it if engaging in a goal-directed (‘concrete’) movement on 
command, we must “seek the reason behind the privilege enjoyed [only by concrete] 
movements” (133). The reason remains unclear, argues Merleau-Ponty, due to the 
deficiencies of “classical psychology [which] does not have any concepts for 
expressing [certain] varieties of consciousness” (136). Thus, to make sense of the 
empirical material, Merleau-Ponty must now make the boundaries of these ‘varieties 
of consciousness’ more explicit by revealing and incorporating their intentional 
structure and rendering their distinctiveness more transparent to investigation. 
Motivating such an analysis is that Schneider’s symptoms defy a straight-forward 
anatomical explanation, as no obvious musculoskeletal impediment prevents 
Schneider from pointing as opposed to grasping. Indeed, Goldstein and Gelb (1918) 
speculated that grasping and pointing become distinguishable at some undefined 
psychological level. Therefore, articulating an unknown ‘psychological’ dimension 
(or: ‘variety of consciousness’), is critical to correctly interpreting the pathology. As a 
phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty frames Schneider’s disassociations as a disruption 
in his motor-intentional comportment toward world. However, the normative 
interrelationship existent between agent and world (aspects of which have broken 
down for Schneider) is not necessarily articulatable with the terminology provided by 
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the so-called ‘classical model’ of psychology. We are blind as to why Schneider 
cannot perform an action that is anatomically identical to another, Merleau-Ponty 
claims, unless that explanation incorporates Schneider’s intentional profile. 
In his analysis, Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl’s notion that the objective body 
(Korper), a physical configuration of organic tissue, is phenomenologically distinct 
from the lived body (Leib), the seat of experience. Schneider (in some instances) 
retains a pre-reflective relation to world via his body-as-Leib; that is, his embodied 
sense of self remains part of an established network of contextually grounded 
actions. Critically, Schneider’s pathology emerges when he must instead relate to his 
body-as-Korper. Here, Schneider’s intentional-object shifts away from a pre-
established network of affordances and ‘inward’ toward his own body as located in 
objective space.  
Therefore, whenever Schneider must take himself as an object, not some task, 
breakdown occurs, and the movement becomes impossible. Generally, when the 
non-clinical agent turns away from pre-established, motor-intentional solicitations 
and towards their own, objective body, an important intentional shift has taken place. 
Typically, this shift is imperceptible because it is harmoniously integrated into 
everyday experience, where the transition is not (necessarily) reflectively registered. 
However, in neuropsychological breakdown, this difference becomes surface visible 
whereupon the patient is capable of one but not the other. Schneider can report 
these symptoms because they developed during adulthood, and so their peculiar, 
‘breakdown’ nature are reflectively accessible to him.  
Schneider’s inability to point extends to other movements “that are not directed at 
any actual situation, such as moving [limbs] on command, extending a finger or 
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describing a position of a body part” [emphasis added] (134). For Merleau-Ponty, this 
observation brings the ‘classical’ model of embodiment into question: if my body is a 
static, extant representation of parts, how can I ‘know’ where my nose is to blow it 
but somehow ‘forget’ its location in order to point to it?5 Once more, the clinical data 
motivates a reconceptualisation of how we understand human motor-intentionality. 
Schneider can swat a mosquito from his arm but cannot point to his arm because the 
former elicits a spontaneous, pre-reflective response and “takes place wholly in the 
order of the phenomenal world, it does not pass through the objective world” (136).  
Schneider has retained a relation to his lived body, albeit in a now distorted, quasi-
reflexive sense. By contrast, pointing to one’s body does takes place in the objective 
world because it intends one’s objective body, which Merleau-Ponty suggests is the 
most salient distinguishing feature for this disassociation. Thus, the cypher for 
understanding Schneider’s behavioural disassociation lies in communicating an 
intentional dissociation. Despite Schneider’s disability, “he is [still] his body and his 
body is a power for a certain world” (137); however, when he must intend his 
objective body, he no longer engages it as a power for the world. Therefore, one 
hidden ‘variety of consciousness’ that renders the symptomatology comprehensible 
is the discrete intentional profile operative in intending ‘world’6 as opposed to 
‘Korper’.  
Merleau-Ponty showcases how one pathology that is anatomically or even 
‘psychologically’ unexplainable may be elucidated by sharpening the role of 
intentionality. Because ‘classical’ psychology is arguably less attuned to this 
 
5 Bermudez (2005) tries to retain a representationalist interpretation by claiming that the body 
representation is something fundamentally non-conceptual. 
6 Or operating with it is as background (Dreyfus 2007a). 
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intentional dimension than is phenomenology, it struggles to distinguish between two 
physiologically near identical, yet intentionally distinct activities. Despite their 
superficial similarity, ‘grasping’ and ‘pointing’ feature distinct intentional profiles 
because, among other features, the former incorporates Leib and the latter intends 
Korper. Phenomenological description is thus in a position to explain, as 
neuropsychologists conceive of explanation, Schneider’s double disassociation while 
remaining within neuropsychology’s epistemological framework.  
V.ii The Analysis of Schneider II: Concrete and Abstract Movement 
Pointing and grasping is but one instance of the more ‘global’ division between 
‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ movement. Merleau-Ponty accepts Goldstein/Gelb’s claim 
that Schneider is capable of the latter but not the former. Returning to the distinction 
between ‘grasping’ and ‘pointing’, because grasping intends a tangible object, its 
intentional-referent guides the action: the intentional-referent and act-of-intending 
constitute a unitary phenomenon. Kelly (2002) notes supporting empirical evidence 
that demonstrated that participants’ hands assume different postures during real 
grasping motions as opposed to when simply mimicking the action. The definite, 
goal-directedness of a genuine grasping motion certifies the movement’s end-point 
as an inseparable component from its inception. By contrast, Schneider cannot 
break away from the habitual affordances that elicit him and intend the world as a 
place of potential action, an act featuring a very different intentional structure.  
If conscious volition alone is sufficient to facilitate all bodily movement, it is difficult to 
see how Schneider fails to accomplish one action while enacting the same physical 
movement in another context. Some contextual factor beyond the distinction 
between Korper and Leib requires articulation. Accounting for this complex 
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disassociation leads Merleau-Ponty to introduce the phenomenological notion of 
projection as an explanatory tool. An improper reading of Merleau-Ponty may lead 
one to speculate that the importance bestowed to embodiment and environment 
reduces the role of traditionally ‘private’ acts such as imagination and planning, 
which the ‘classical model’ might assume are contained within the individual’s 
psyche. By contrast, Schneider’s pathology divulges the intimate co-determination 
between planning, imagination and acts of world-directed, motor-intentionality. 
Indeed, an observable ‘breakdown’ in the otherwise harmonious relationship 
between these acts, as witnessed in Schneider, highlight the importance of the non-
clinical subject’s ability to insert themselves into fictitious scenarios and become 
cognisant of their place within hypothetical contexts. Projects, which 
phenomenologists argue structure the world’s presentation to us, depend on an 
ability to project; it is this future-orientated capacity that remains absent in 
Schneider’s being-in-the-world. Schneider is prohibited from being “situated in the 
virtual” (139) and can only orientate himself towards the actual, while his world 
seems to move ‘by itself’ and sweeps up his body along with it. Conversely, the non-
clinical agent seamlessly “reckons with the possible, which acquires a sort of 
actuality without leaving behind its place as a possibility” (140). ‘Abstract movement’ 
is thus the signifier that one can successfully break with one’s pre-established motor 
repertoire and allow possible affording-features to call one to action, so as to 
complete novel actions. 
Further evidence of Schneider’s projective deficit manifests in his inability to ‘simply’ 
move his arm upwards when requested. To do so, he must first animate his entire 
body until empirically ‘finding’ his arm, before ‘finding’ his head to gain bearing on the 
direction ‘up’. Merleau-Ponty notes that these movements serve to create a kind of 
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supplementary ‘kinaesthetic background’, a background that is always present for 
the non-clinical agent, but which requires tedious reconstruction by the patient. 
Establishing this background is completed via a continuous animation of his entire 
body until the correct parts become empirically locatable. Only after this series of 
inferences and calculations may the ‘abstract movement’ be attempted.  
Once again adhering to the logic of neuropsychology, Merleau-Ponty suggests that 
what is always present (yet concealed) for the non-clinical agent becomes 
transparent when observing its absence in the clinical agent. Schneider’s 
preparatory movements, necessary for finding a limb or pinpointing a touch, bring the 
objective body into reflective consciousness, which we learned is problematic for 
Schneider. Because Schneider lacks constant attunement with his capacity for 
projected motor-intentionality, he must check the position of his limbs like a scientist 
observing something alien to everyday experience; his body cannot depart from the 
‘concrete’ and orient itself towards the nexus of potential possibilities through volition 
alone.7  
As Dreyfus (2007a) highlights, Schneider has no problem with “inner-horizonal” task 
switching; say, from cutting a wallet to sewing a wallet. Nor does Schneider face 
difficulty with the semantic comprehension of the experimenter’s instructions. Rather, 
the experimenter’s words lack “motor signification” for Schneider: he cannot transfer 
verbal imperatives onto his lived body because the projective motor-significance of 
the instructions “no longer speak to him” (141). Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, 
incorporating the notion of projection into the interpretation means that: 
 
7 We may even say that the empiricist model of mind closely matches the brain-damaged patient. 
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The distinction between abstract and concrete movement is thereby clarified: the 
background of concrete movement is the given world [whereas] the background of 
abstract movement is constructed (141). 
Merleau-Ponty concludes that concrete action diverges from abstract movement 
insofar as the latter carves out and establishes a kind of self-sustaining phenomenal 
background, whereas the former always rests upon a precedent of prior behaviour, a 
set of motor skills that constitute one’s prereflective background-for-action. In 
Merleau-Ponty’s lexicon, abstract movement is “centrifugal” while concrete 
movement is “centripetal”. Whereas concrete movement showcases an established, 
pre-reflective pattern of engagement that absorbs the body, “abstract movement 
hollows out a zone of reflection and subjectivity” (142). This ‘reflective’ aspect of my 
being-in-the-world somehow separates me from my immediate actuality and enables 
me first to envisage how I will perform a particular action, thus aligning my body with 
the task before the action is initiated.  
Merleau-Ponty’s summarises his interpretation of why Schneider lacks the ability 
direct himself to novel goals thusly: “in order to possess my body independently of all 
urgent tasks [and] make use of it in my imagination… I must invert the relation 
between my body and the surroundings” (143). In orienting myself towards an 
undetermined referent, I interrupt an established system of which I am a part of and 
seek out an uncharted aspect of the world to take up as reference point. If the 
patient’s condition strips him of the capacity to throw himself into possible worlds, he 
instead resembles “the status of a thing” (141). The experience of Schneider, claims 
Merleau-Ponty, is akin to remaining enclosed in a prearranged world, as part of a 
causal chain, the structure of which was apparently determined by Schneider’s pre-
injury mode of being-in-the-world. With his ‘zone of reflection’ absent, Schneider 
lacks the ability to generate or even obey new goals which, in the normal subject, 
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would structure the sensorimotor field and allow hypothetical ‘motor signification’ to 
emerge as a reality. Indeed, this is why Goldstein and Scheerer (1964, p. 8) claim 
that, for the normal person, “both attitudes are always present in a definite figure-
ground relation”.  
In summary, Merleau-Ponty’s (neuro)phenomenological reading of Goldstein and 
Gelb’s case study clarified some previously unclear thematic elements. 
Phenomenology’s ability to parse apart otherwise concealed “varieties of 
consciousness” helped to provide a conceptual framework of interpretation 
positioned to expound Schneider’s perplexing cognitive-behavioural deficits by 
pivoting to his behaviour’s intentional structure. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty 
suggests that the contrast case of pathological motor-intentionality, as provided by 
Schneider, illuminates motor-intentionality’s more general structure. Namely, the 
importance of distinguishing between Korper and Leib, and the importance of 
projection for normative being-in-the-world, was seemingly evidenced by clinical 
breakdown rendering their absence or difference salient. As such, we have a 
persuasive case for the reciprocal relationship between phenomenological 
description and neuropsychological evidence. 
VI. Phenomenology and Science 
Summarising Merleau-Ponty’s I-NP approach could assume the propositional form: 
Disorder X appears perplexing through the filter of ‘classical’ psychology; yet, when 
thrown into relief against a phenomenological background, salient characteristics of 
the disorder suddenly appear explicable. By implication, Merleau-Ponty believes that 
phenomenological description can temporarily assume the role of a psychological 
theory. While this notion may constitute a heresy for orthodox phenomenologists 
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(Merleau-Ponty himself rarely employs ‘explanation’), we are employing the term 
‘explanation’ as used, somewhat uniquely, in the neurosciences. For neuroscience, 
obtaining a finer-grained description of experience, providing theoretical context to 
behavioural abnormalities, and disentangling cognitive-behavioural acts from one 
another all feature significant explanatory value. In neuropsychology in particular, 
revealing the structural differences that distinguish behaviours are a prized asset for 
the interpretation of evidence. 
Of course, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is not slavishly subordinate to empirical 
psychology, nor is it reduced to being the ‘handmaiden to science’ as per Locke. 
However, Merleau-Ponty wishes to showcase how psychology and neuropsychology 
can profit from phenomenology’s sophisticated descriptions of lived experience and 
how pathological motor-intentionality is revelatory of its non-pathological analogue. 
Merleau-Ponty articulates this as follows: 
if the description of one’s own body in classical psychology already offered everything 
necessary to distinguish the body from objects, how did psychologists fail to make this 
distinction [or] fail in each case to draw any philosophical consequence? (124). 
Irrespective of this rhetorical question’s actual answer, our attention should be drawn 
to Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on classical psychology. Heidegger’s philosophy is 
never psychological because psychology is an ontic discipline that accumulates 
facts; its reach extends no further than the ‘being of beings’. By contrast, Merleau-
Ponty’s criticism of ‘classical psychology’ remains firmly within the standards of 
psychological discourse. Merleau-Ponty accepts the psychological concept of ‘body 
schema’ (which is not a phenomenological notion) before adjusting it to, he thinks, 
better fit the clinical data as reported. Phenomenology was deemed suitable for this 
role because, as distorted experiences and behaviours constituted the empirical 
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evidence, the evidence wandered into phenomenological territory. Classical 
psychology only failed to satisfactorily explain the totality of Schneider’s symptoms 
because it faced an impasse due to its inherited philosophical positions.  
Because, in this example of neurophenomenological research, the concrete data 
guided the interpretation, there is little to distinguish Merleau-Ponty’s I-NP approach 
from conventional (neuro)psychology. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis need not make any 
contribution to neurophysiological knowledge (i.e., greater specificity on the location 
of the injury) to be considered neuropsychological. Rather, the challenging 
interpretative work required in describing the cognitive-experiential domain, the 
explanatory focal point for the patient’s symptomatology, is an indispensable 
component of most neuropsychological evaluations. Explicating Schneider’s 
symptoms required a satisfactory model of consciousness, a feat that is attemptable 
with several frameworks, all of which must remain tethered to the concrete results 
(the explananda). If some of the data are unexplainable through the classical model, 
a shift in outlook is justifiable and even embraced. 
Nevertheless, psychology’s absorption into a phenomenological framework does not 
necessarily rob it of its status as a psychological investigation and render it ‘purely’ 
philosophical. A key principle underlying I-NP is that the empirical data is separable 
from its conceptual interpretation. Removing phenomenology from the equation does 
not negate (or support) the experiment’s empirical validity. This particular example of 
phenomenological analysis is entwined with the findings of the Schneider case 
study: a real person who suffered with a real disorder. Had Schneider’s condition 
happened to be different, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological interpretation would 




VII. Contemporary Reception 
How has Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema and the Schneider case 
study been received by contemporary neuroscience, whether by direct influence or 
comparative similarity? In the journal Neuropsychologia, De Vignemont (2010) cites 
Merleau-Ponty’s work several times when expounding three main criteria for the 
currently most widely-accepted model of the body schema: ‘availability to 
consciousness’, ‘dynamics’, and ‘functional role’. Each component of De 
Vignemont’s tripartite taxonomy appears (at least) broadly consonant with Merleau-
Ponty’s interpretation. Recall how Merleau-Ponty emphasises that different parts of 
the body schema emerge and rescind into prominence (‘availability to 
consciousness’) on the basis of our goal-directed intentionality (‘functional role’) in a 
plastic fashion that is constantly in dialogue with environmental demands 
(‘dynamics’).  
Gallagher (1986) formalised Merleau-Ponty’s amendment of the distinction between 
Leib and Korper into the cognitive sciences as ‘body schema’ and ‘body image’, 
respectively. In brief, ‘body schema’ still designates one’s task-directed intentional 
profile as manifest in the body (Leib), while ‘body image’ (Korper) designates an act 
of intending that takes one’s body as its object. Through Gallagher’s model, Merleau-
Ponty’s intentional distinction has been further absorbed into mainstream 
neuroscience. For instance, in his overview of the 6 major types of body 
representation, Longo (2016) includes both body image and body schema.8 
Nonetheless, one should be hesitant to declare an unqualified convergence between 





when discussing the body schema, both De Vignemont (2010) and Longo (2008) 
describe it as sensorimotor representation. A phenomenological interlocutor may 
ask: ‘but who exactly is representing the body’? 
Other areas of contemporary neuroscience have made similar use of Merleau-
Ponty’s account of motor-intentionality. Gallese (2011) cites Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of motor-intentionality as influential to his embodied simulation 
hypothesis and to his interpretation of the function of peripersonal neurons. Berthoz 
(2000) utilised Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema in his 
neuroscientific account of movement, assimilating it with a Husserlian 
phenomenology of temporality. In the field of nursing science, insights from Merleau-
Ponty’s analysis of Schneider has found practical application to nursing practice with 
hemi-spatial neglect patients (Klinke, Thorsteinsson, and Jónsdóttir 2014).  
However, as Goldstein/Gelb’s case study was one of the earliest instantiations of 
neuropsychological research, Merleau-Ponty’s heavy reliance on it might introduce 
further methodological and epistemological concerns. For instance, Goldenberg 
(2003) has suggested that the original case study contains serious methodological 
flaws and even that Schneider may have exaggerated some of his symptoms. 
However, Marotta & Behrman (2004) contest this claim by detailing how Schneider’s 
conditions are classifiable under a contemporary criterion. Moreover, Laris (1982) 
and Farah (2004) have noted that other neuropsychological patients with pathologies 
similar to Schneider’s have adopted comparable compensatory strategies. 
Therefore, there is little reason to reject the Schneider case study wholesale instead 
of advising caution in its interpretation. 
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However, it should also be underlined that, as a project tied to concrete empirical 
results, I-NP bares little direct blame for the methodological flaws of the material it 
interprets, no more than computationalism’s language of ‘memory storage’ ‘and 
‘information-processing’ are to blame for a study’s empirical failings. Even if the 
empirical study that is interpreted contains empirical flaws, I-NP’s investigative logic 
can remain intact. Additionally, as Gallagher (2010) states, contemporary adopters of 
I-NP should nonetheless seek experimental validation of their interpretations, an 
opportunity that was apparently unavailable to Merleau-Ponty. Nevertheless, a critic 
may still hold that philosophical analysis is in principle ill-suited to the kind of 
interpretative work required by neuropsychology. Cole (2008) even terms the rash 
enthusiasm with which philosophers take up cases of neuropathology to justify their 
claims as the “Schneider problem”. 
Does Cole’s criticism present a damaging blow to phenomenological interpretations 
of neuropsychopathology? Not quite. In conjunction with Gallagher, Cole himself 
adopted an I-NP approach to interpret another neuropsychological patient’s 
symptomatology using phenomenological resources (Gallagher and Cole 1995). This 
study utilised and refined the distinction between body image and body schema in 
the study of patient I.W, who suffered from a severe proprioceptive deficit. Among 
other hypotheses, Gallagher and Cole suggested that I.W substituted his body 
image, “in a partial and imperfect way” for his body schema. Thus, even critics of 
particular instantiations of philosophical neuropsychology have deemed it possible to 




In sum, I-NP showcases the ability of phenomenology to relay the ‘cognitive-
experiential’ dimension, when such a function is explicitly required, by utilising a 
particular language to filter empirical findings according to a conceptual prism. 
Indeed, key elements of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation are expressible as 
hypotheses and, as such, are susceptible to falsification or alteration in the face of 
conflicting empirical evidence. If a future patient who shares Schneider’s diagnoses 
retains, for example, the projective function, or uses a different strategy to 
compensate for its deficit, the interpretation must be altered to incorporate this new 
data.  
The case example discussed here showcased how a set of established empirical 
findings profited from a focused phenomenological interpretation. The psychological 
construct ‘body schema’ and clinical examples of double disassociation were 
interpreted, with at least partial success, through conceptual tools supplied by 
phenomenology. With regards the latter endeavour, symptoms were explained by 
appealing to an underlying phenomenological difference which, when made explicit, 
rendered the double disassociation more comprehensible. Meanwhile, Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological account of motor-intentionality was crafted in dialogue 
with explicitly psychological concepts and clinical findings, suggesting that 
phenomenological inquiry can attempt to evidence its claims with empirical 
resources. 
The contemporary reception of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation can be compared with 
analogous theories from the mid-forties. Aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s research may 
require tweaking, or modification in light of newer discoveries, yet several 
weaknesses are attributable to the state of the art at the time (Gallagher 2010). This 
qualification may be a distinguishing factor between phenomenology and 
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neurophenomenology. That is, any flaws in Husserlian phenomenology are 
completely unrelated to methodological flaws in scientific psychology. However, as 
empirical evidence assumes a lead role in I-NP, the interpretation’s validity is, like 
any psychological theory, always dependent on the data’s validity, as the specificities 















Chapter 2. Experimental Neurophenomenology: Epilepsy 
I. Introduction 
In the last chapter, we saw how emphasising the subject’s intentional orientation 
elucidated otherwise unclear empirical findings. One possible contribution proffered 
by the neurophenomenological approach is that of grounding ‘mental events’ against 
a meaning-conferring background. Such a step contributes toward mitigating a 
recurrent epistemological problem in scientific psychology; namely, that meaning and 
context are eliminated in experimental studies, yet their inclusion would otherwise 
have positively informed the interpretation of empirical evidence (Iacaboni 2006). 
The phenomenologist may further argue that redefining experience as an 
‘experimental variable’ diminishes the value of its inclusion, as its ability to provide 
qualitative evidence is impaired.  
Nonetheless, the separation of a portion of experience from its global context may be 
necessary and unavoidable in certain cases. A research topic may be especially 
amenable to experimental investigation if the demarcation of a mental event is 
important, relatively straightforward, or its occurrence is otherwise rare or 
pathological. This demarcation is particularly crucial in neuroimaging experiments, 
where success is dependent on segregating a specific network of neural activity and 
its specific cognitive-experiential correlate. Part of this chapter’s purpose is to 
analyse a research initiative where a class of experiences and their neural correlate 
seemingly profited from application of the experimental method. 
Thus, neurophenomenology is not limited to contextualising empirical discoveries by 
translating them ad-hoc through phenomenology’s well-tuned hermeneutical lens; 
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rather, it can ingratiate itself into the experimental design at a foundational level 
through the framing and modifying of data collection and data analysis. Experimental 
neurophenomenology (E-NP), as pioneered by Lutz and Thompson’s (2003) study of 
the anticipatory features of visual perception, generates novel data in accordance 
with the epistemological standards of a cognitive neuroscientific experiment. When 
evaluating this approach, we should be cognisant that the success of any 
experimental design is firmly conditional on the results obtained. However, E-NP is 
subject to an additional condition in that it must retain its right to be called a 
phenomenological approach. 
To productively adapt phenomenology to the experimental setting, some theoretical 
sacrifices and compromises are required. In E-NP’s experimental protocol, the 
Husserlian epoché is rehabilitated from its function of revealing the transcendental 
characteristics of phenomena and repurposed as a means of ‘measuring’ otherwise 
opaque dimensions of experience. Correspondingly, these newly obtained 
descriptions must be repackaged as (and some may say reduced to) ‘subjective 
data’, to complement the ‘objective data’ supplied via neuroimaging. Experimental 
neurophenomenology thus seeks to correlate two datasets, neurophysiological and 
phenomenological, that together will characterise a circumscribed ‘neuro-experiential 
event’. E-NP must explicitly designate a zone of inquiry where recognisable 
expressions of both experience and neurophysiological activity are specifiable and 
that simultaneously stand to benefit from the application of the experimental method 
and its logic of isolation and correlation. 
To investigate this approach further, we will turn to a research initiative that 
seemingly profited from an E-NP approach: a series of studies conducted by 
research teams led by Varela (2001), Le Van Queyen (2003) and Petitmengin 
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(2006), sometimes referred to collectively as ‘the Paris group’. Over several years, 
these researchers applied neuroscientific and phenomenological research 
techniques to disclose previously unknown neurological and experiential markers of 
epilepsy. Petitmengin (2009) provides a metareview of their collective efforts which 
will serve as the primary reference-point for the present analysis. These studies are 
viewed as exemplifying the E-NP approach, predominately through recourse to the 
concrete, experimental results that were obtained and their subsequent application. 
II. Epilepsy 
Epilepsy is a serious and chronic neurological disorder affecting approximately 1% of 
the population. It is characterised by temporary and unpredictable cerebral 
hyperactivity that manifests in the form of an epileptic seizure. An epileptic seizure’s 
full duration persists from seconds to minutes but never exceeds five minutes. 
Typically, the seizure begins in one neural area (the ‘epileptic focus’) before 
spreading out to other regions or, in severe cases, the entire brain (Petitmengin 
2009). Prior to advances made in the last two decades, detecting any indicative 
modifications in brain or behaviour prior to seizure onset proved challenging. 
Imaging the seizure itself was possible (typically by using electrodes placed inside 
the cranium) but any distinguishable pattern of activity leading up to seizure onset 
was largely imperceptible. 
A series of interconnected studies, beginning with Mormann et al. (2000) and 
culminating with Petitmengin’s (2009) metareview, aimed to disclose the full ‘life-
cycle’ of a seizure as an interrelated neurological and experiential phenomenon. To 
succeed, the Paris group needed to establish a correlation between both dimensions 
of the designated ‘neuro-experiential event’. Initially, they found a distinct pattern of 
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previously unclassified neural activity that emerges immediately before seizure 
onset. This period of activity was chosen as the focus for a follow-up study that 
sought to correlate it with a commensurate phenomenological profile.  
This research initiative displays a simple yet potentially pioneering investigative logic. 
Firstly, the neurological reality of an object of inquiry is confirmed: in this case, the 
preictal stage of a seizure. This satisfies an initial neuroscientific evidential standard 
that the entity under investigation is real, or using Bhaskar’s (1978) categorisation of 
scientific phenomena, ‘actual’. Thereafter, this neurological profile must be 
accurately matched with a phenomenological profile by training participants to 
achieve greater awareness of how this stage manifests in experience. 
Some initial caveats require articulation regarding the ability to generalise this 
specific research to neurophenomenology as a whole. Firstly, the phenomenological 
canon is beset with claims that phenomenal experience is either not caused by, too 
complex for, or categorically distinct from anything happening in the brain, meaning 
that establishing any such correlation features little merit. Furthermore, we should be 
hesitant to suggest that all neurological activity can be transferred into reflective 
awareness and thus made describable; countless neurological processes will likely 
remain forever experientially inaccessible. 
However, if promotion from a low-grade picture of an intentional-object or act-of-
intending into a high-grade picture is indeed possible and necessary for a 
neuroscientific study, we should consider E-NP’s methodological approach as a 
major contender for its realisation. Indeed, the specific research initiative evaluated 
here is exemplary because it seems well-suited to the pragmatic motivations 
enshrined in clinical research. Namely, epileptic patients who successfully achieve 
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greater awareness of experiential indicators of an imminent seizure are consequently 
better equipped to take beneficial or even life-saving actions to protect themselves 
from harmful consequences.  
III. Establishing the Neurological Profile 
The turn of the 21st century brought with it several advances in neuroimaging; 
included therein was the ability to detect the neurological profile of an onset epileptic 
seizure (Mormann et al. 2000; Varela et al. 2001). This development was 
accomplished with the ‘neuro-dynamic’ model, which permits the mapping of 
spatially disparate brain regions whenever these regions coalesce into a singular 
neural event (i.e., an epileptic seizure). The underlying hypothesis runs that a neuro-
experiential event does not correspond directly to any singular brain area but 
emerges from a distinct pattern of activity distributed across several regions at a 
global scale. A neuro-experiential event is neither caused by nor correlated with one 
isolated neural region but rather with several neural populations activating in a 
unique configuration. Upon synchronising into a ‘phase-relationship’, the rhythms 
emitted by these neural populations are identifiable using neuroimaging (Lachaux et 
al., 1999).  
The neuro-dynamic method therefore modelled the epileptic seizure as an event 
characterised by several such phase-relationships (Petitmengin 2009). At first 
glance, this achievement appears to derive exclusively from technological 
developments. However, its success is perhaps equally enabled by developments in 
conceptual sophistication. The theoretical model of brain organisation defined by 
circular causality, as propagated in neuro-dynamics, matured alongside with, and 
under the influence of, phenomenological philosophy (Varela et al. 2001; Freeman 
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2001). Neuro-dynamics conceives the brain as “self-producing and involved in a 
continuous sensorimotor dynamic [with the] environment” (Rudrauf et al. 2003). 
Indeed, the neuro-dynamic model exemplifies the influence of nonlinear dynamic 
systems (Port and van Gelder 1995) in the cognitive sciences, which Gallagher and 
Zahavi (2012) note is an integral element of (experimental) neurophenomenology.  
In light of this, Petitmengin (2009) opposes an unqualified conceptual commitment to 
linear causality and computationalism in the neurosciences, claiming that the 
“neuronal dynamic is not organised in sequential order, as the ‘computer’ metaphor 
would have it”. ‘The computer metaphor’ apparently denotes the philosophical notion 
that the minded brain shares ontological features or status with a computing 
machine. To avoid the purported conceptual blind-alley of equating the brain with a 
fleshy computer, Petitmengin instead opts for the “orchestra” as her metaphor of 
choice, emphasising holism and dynamism over reductionism. Therefore, since 
further discussion of the neuro-dynamic method is not possible here, suffice it to say 
that it shares several philosophical assumptions with phenomenology. 
Which concrete empirical results emerged from application of the neuro-dynamic 
method to epilepsy? Through intra-cranial EEG recordings, the neuro-dynamic 
model revealed several synchronised patterns of neural activity that constitute the 
‘life-cycle’ of an epileptic seizure. The stages are sub-dividable into three categories: 
‘ictal’, ‘interictal’ and ‘preictal’ (Le Van Quyen et al., 2001b; Varela et al., 2001). This 
picture can be simplified by viewing the ‘ictal’ phase as the epileptic seizure itself, the 
‘preictal’ phase as the period building toward the seizure and the ‘interictal’ stage as 
the intermittence between normal cerebral activity and seizure onset.  
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Varela et al. (2001) demonstrated that the preictal phase occurrent immediately 
before a seizure is identifiable by a particular pattern of abnormal communication 
across neural populations. Among the eight epileptic patients studied, Varela et al. 
(2001) found that, in 77% of the seizures, “a decrease in synchronisation of the 
neuronal populations surrounding the epileptic focus is observed within the 10-25 Hz 
range […] 5 minutes prior to the seizure onset”. This relationship is known as ‘phase-
scattering’.  
By contrast, the ictal stage (seizure onset) featured a “higher synchronisation of 
neurons surrounding the epileptic focus” whereby the epileptic focus is “isolated from 
the rest of the brain” in terms of global, interacting connections. Thus, during the 
preictal stage, there is an decreased neural synchronisation surrounding the epileptic 
focus. Conversely, during the ictal (seizure) stage, there is a increased 
synchronisation (see fig. 1). Evidence gained from these recordings indicates that 
“the seizure does not arise suddenly, [there] is a transition from the interictal to the 
preictal state” and that “a seizure does not correspond to a precise area of the brain, 
but to deficient functioning of neural networks, related by abnormally facilitated 
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connections” (Petitmengin 2009).  
   
Petitmengin then notes that this data fails to “tell us anything about the way this 
transition is felt by the patient”. This would beg the question as to whether there 
existed an experiential profile that correlated with the neurological profile. Could this 
transitional phase (the ‘preictal stage’ preceding the seizure) be made experientially 
transparent and, if so, through which tools? Furthermore, if successful, the pairing of 
novel phenomenological and neurological data could establish a template for E-NP 
research generally. That is, newly-discovered patterns of neurological activity could 
point to as yet unreported dimensions of phenomenal experience, and vice versa. 
Under this paradigm, neuroscientists are not solely reliant on existing, folk-
psychological descriptions of experience, but can implement a procedure specifically 
designed to discover a neurophysiological finding’s ‘experiential correlate’. 
IV. The Epoché as Qualitative Measure 
Despite the technical impressiveness of mapping the preictal stage’s neurological 
profile, this achievement confers little practical benefit for epileptic patients. The 
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impetus driving clinical research stipulates that success is often best evidenced by 
enabling patients to better manage their illnesses. Under most circumstances, 
epileptic patients will not be connected to intracranial recording equipment in a 
clinical environment. Therefore, maximising the clinical utility of the preictal stage’s 
identification necessitates that the neurological findings are ‘cashed in’ in first-person 
terms.  
Importantly, experiential descriptions characteristic of the preictal stage had 
seemingly not emerged in everyday language among epileptic patients. Yet, with the 
preictal stage established as a neurophysiological ‘reality’, it became justifiable to 
hypothesise the existence of an experiential correlate. The contribution of 
phenomenological resources to this initiative was as a means of accessing and 
measuring this otherwise unarticulated domain of experience.  
Prior investigations into the then-unclassified preictal stage (termed ‘prodromes’ or 
simply ‘warning symptoms’) were measured with the use of questionnaires. 
However, questionnaires often feature an impoverished descriptive value for 
conveying certain kinds of first-person experience, as questions are prewritten 
without patient input, and the answers must undergo quantification. While the 
questionnaire may be adequate for reporting the subject’s explicit beliefs and 
opinions, it is often less effective for capturing the more intricate details of 
experience. The interview method, while more time-intensive, is perceived as 
providing a higher level of qualitative precision when properly applied (Haslam and 
McGarty 2014). In pursuit of an adequate qualitative measure of preictal experience, 
Petitmengin et al. (2006) employed semi-structured interviews of a 90-minute 
duration that operationalised the ‘phenomenological reduction’ (epoché) as a method 
for data-collection.  
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While E-NP’s success is predominately anchored to the significance of its empirical 
results, it faces an additional hurdle regarding its employment of phenomenological 
terminology. Specifically, the neurophenomenologist must substantiate their adoption 
of the ‘phenomenological reduction’ or ‘epoché’. The inevitable controversies 
surrounding the multiple definitions of the epoché(s) are outside the scope of the 
present discussion. However, it is important to briefly evaluate the compatibility 
between neurophenomenology’s operationalised epoché and Husserl’s employment 
of the term. For neurophenomenology to successfully adopt the epoché it must, on 
the one hand, demonstrate (at least) a passing resemblance to Husserl’s method 
and, on the other, distinguish itself as an empirically useful qualitative measure. 
Husserl developed the epoché in the service of uncovering an epistemological 
grounding for philosophy and later as a professed ‘science of essences’ (Zahavi 
2003). The purpose of the epoché was not, as Husserl ceaselessly emphasised, to 
reveal the fleeting contents of consciousness. Husserl (1913/2012) explained that 
the epoché pursues the “goal [of] winning a new region of Being…(p.55), which 
shows things “transcendentally purified in regard to the way in which we apprehend 
[them]” (p. 97).  
To determine whether both the Husserlian and experimental epoché might constitute 
a single genus, we will concentrate on two of the epoché’s central features as 
outlined by Husserl. The first pertains to the aforementioned goal of “winning” an 
otherwise absent region of phenomenal experience through adopting a particular 
methodology. The second relates to the value-judgement that this newly obtained 
information is somehow “purified” (though without reference to the transcendental 
realm that interests Husserl). 
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A shortcoming in Petitmengin’s (2009) meta-review is the investigative work required 
to clarify the experimental epoché’s methodological specificities and theoretical 
foundations. However, elsewhere Petitmengin et al. (2006) identifies the techniques 
pioneered by Lutz and Thompson (2003) as determinate of her methodology. In their 
study of visual perception, Lutz and Thompson implemented the epoché to “mobilize 
and intensify the tacit self-awareness of experience by inducing an explicit attitude of 
attentive self-awareness”. They trained participants to implement the operationalised 
reduction as objects were displayed on a screen to acquire “detailed first-person 
descriptions of the categorical features of experience” with regards to the subject’s 
anticipation of the object’s appearance.  
Three categories of ‘perceptual readiness’ emerged from the participant’s reports. 
These novel categories were then correlated with data from simultaneous EEG 
recordings. The crucial take away from this study was that the reported descriptions 
of anticipatory experience correlated with otherwise undefined patterns of 
neurophysiological activity. Measurable patterns of activity in the neuroimaging 
(EEG) data, having no clear cognitive-experiential correlate, would have otherwise 
been ignored as ‘noise’. Thus, epoché-acquired profiles of experience promoted the 
detection of novel patterns of neural activity. The epoché is thus defensible on the 
grounds that, as features of experience are not necessarily transparent to the agent, 
and patterns of EEG data not necessarily transparent to investigators, both are 
potentially retrievable upon application of the correct experimental measure.  
At the level of praxis, Depraz (1999; 2000) identified structural commonalities that 
supposedly underlie several variations of the epoché, in part to explicitly provide 
philosophical support for neurophenomenology (Varela, Depraz and Vermersch 
1999). According to Depraz (1999), there exist three ‘ways’ into the reduction: ‘the 
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Cartesian way’, ‘the psychological way’ and ‘the way of the life-word’. It is the second 
category that interests us here. The psychological way is “proper to the 
phenomenological psychologist” though it “obliterates the radical, transcendental 
concern” determinative of the transcendental approach. Under the psychological 
reduction, the agent engages in an “attentive observation” whereby salient features 
of a circumscribed intentional-object become increasingly transparent to reflective 
consciousness. Whereas the transcendental reduction often explicates the structure 
of the act-of-intending, the psychological reduction is content to, if necessary, delimit 
its interest to the object(s) of experience.9 
Furthermore, Depraz et al. (2000) forward a tripartite structure of the epoché that 
ostensibly scaffolds most of its possible implementations: Suspension, Redirection 
and Receptivity. With regards the psychological reduction, this procedure involves an 
initial suspension of the irrelevant elements contained in the flow of experience 
followed by a deliberate redirection toward the intentional-object pertinent to the 
investigation. This procedure is purported to heighten receptivity to otherwise 
concealed elements of experience engendered by the intentional-object. To clarify 
what “attentive observation” denotes, Depraz (1999) elicits Husserl’s notion of 
affection. Purportedly, affection bypasses the dichotomy between engaged, active 
attention and receptive, passive attention. In a state of affection, the agent’s attention 
is not merely elicited by an existent phenomenon but rather it phenomenologically 
interrogates it. 
While Husserl’s transcendental epoché is committed to liberation from metaphysical 
and scientific presuppositions, the experimental epoché is not particularly wedded to 
 
9 However, Lutz and Thompson (2003) claim to showcase how the epoché may disclose structural 
elements of intending-acts. 
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this feature outside of ‘bracketing’ irrelevant first-person data, such as the patient’s 
dislike of their medical condition or simultaneous desire for a cup of coffee. Agents 
can intend an object in (for our purposes here) two broadly-defined ways: as a 
theoretical construct or how it is given in immediate experience. In both cases, the 
intentional act ‘interrogates’ the intentional-object (i.e., the preictal stage).  
In this study, the patient must actively orient their attention toward experiences given 
immediately by the preictal stage and not towards secondary, derivative features of it 
(such as a theory about what the preictal stage is). Again, E-NP is uninterested in 
recording how the participant experiences the object at the levels of belief, opinion or 
theory. Rather, what interests the experimenters is how to expand the participant’s 
awareness of experiences that characterise the intentional-object at a largely pre-
reflective level. 
However, this endeavour requires assistance from a trained experimenter. The 
neurophenomenologist holds that participants are neither infallible in their ability to 
report their experiences (Lutz and Thompson 2003) nor capable of independently 
maintaining the epoché for lengthy periods (Depraz 1999). Indeed, Depraz notes 
that, as an ultimately embodied and temporally-situated act, the epoché is difficult to 
sustain for any protracted length of time. As such, the experimenter plays a vital role 
in guiding the subject’s maintenance of the epoché, continually redirecting their 
attention toward the selected intentional-object when necessary (see below). We 
might therefore label the measure employed in E-NP as a heterophenomenological 
reduction.  
In (very) simplified terms, the experimental epoché’s primary function is to make 
otherwise dormant experiences reflectively accessible. E-NP operationalises this 
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feature as a means of data-generation whereby descriptions of phenomenal 
experience are newly available on both a first-person and third-person basis. That is, 
the epileptic patient first gains awareness of a field of otherwise concealed preictal 
experiences and can subsequently report them to the experimenter. An obvious 
criticism may here point to the epistemological fragility of first-person data. However, 
this facet is not unique to neurophenomenology; cognitive neuroscience readily 
admits of experiential correlates to distinct patterns of neural activity, yet often may 
simply borrow its descriptions from their folk-psychological usage.  
Defenders of neurophenomenology might therefore respond that the epoché delivers 
qualitative data of a greater descriptive accuracy and amenability to experimental 
manipulations. Indeed, Zahavi (2003) argues that “replacing non-scientific (in this 
case, folk psychological) concepts to guide our experiments, increases the amount 
of control cognitive scientists can use to frame their explananda”. This facet is 
particularly useful when novel patterns of neural activity (without a pre-established 
experiential correlate) are discovered, as the epoché can attempt to articulate their 
experiential correlate where none have been reported in folk-psychological terms 
thus far. 
With these points in mind, the operationalised epoché’s employment in lieu of 
alternative measures is perhaps easier to justify. As a qualitative measure, the 
epoché represents a unique way of measuring a targeted zone of phenomenal 
experience. Through its structural components of suspension, redirection and 
receptivity (Depraz 2000), the epoché possesses an approximate guideline for 
collecting unique forms of data. Simultaneously, the epoché can perform the 
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additional function of removing experiential ‘confound variables’: the extraneous 
variables which corrupt the data through accidental inclusion.10  
Following this analogy, the epoché helps to filter out the unwanted grains of 
irrelevant phenomena (the confounds), leaving a supposedly ‘purified’ version of the 
experience for the experimenters to measure. If successful, the experimenters obtain 
a categorical set of experiences (e.g., those unique only to the preictal stage of a 
seizure) instead of experiences that simply happen to co-occur within the same 
timeframe. Consequently, this ‘purified’ experiential data has superior value as a 
correlate of the neuroimaging data, which has its own procedures for the elimination 
of confounds.  
A pertinent example of a confounding factor that might contaminate the 
phenomenological data assessed here relates to the patients’ fears that reliving a 
seizure will provoke another. This is no mere superstition: Navarro et al. (2006) 
found that remembering a past seizure can indeed cause another to reoccur. But 
such experiences of ‘fear’ or ‘apprehension’ do not represent facets of direct preictal 
experience of the kind targeted by the experimental epoché. Even if these mental 
states intend a seizure, they are nonetheless directed towards the hypothetical 
possibility that another seizure might occur. As such, we might say they are 
secondary, not primary expressions of the preictal stage; on this basis, they are 
candidates for removal. Therefore, it is precisely in this sense that the experimental 
epoché might to said to reveal the so-called ‘essential characteristics’ of the 
phenomenon under investigation. 
 
10 An analogue from medical biology would be disaggregating alcohol abuse from a study on the 
genetic basis of liver disease. 
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V. The Phenomenological Data 
In acquiring the phenomenological data, the Paris group had to avoid contaminating 
the patients’ reports through use of leading questions. They navigated this dilemma 
by asking strictly open-ended questions, such as “what sensations do you remember 
during this period?”. Moreover, the experimenters induced a degree of contextual 
awareness in the patients, asking them to relive “the spatio-temporal context of the 
experience: (when, where with whom?)”. However, this instruction simply serves to 
reignite the patient’s memory, not to contextualise their experiences within an 
ecological background of meaning.  
Indeed, this factor leads directly onto a significant methodological problematic of the 
study. Namely, that the phenomenological data were retrieved from the patient’s 
memories. This problem is not incurred in other neurophenomenological 
experiments, and the simplest explanation for its occurrence here is the 
unavoidability of conducting the research immediately prior to a real seizure. 
Nonetheless, critics can point to an unescapably sharp phenomenological distinction 
between immediate experience and experience as recalled through memory. Husserl 
himself attributed substantial importance to this distinction (Brough 1975).  
One possible escape route for this conundrum sidesteps the problem by an appeal 
to the epistemological standards operative in empirical neuroscience. The goal of 
obtaining a robust set of results entails that a neuroscientific experiment is less 
concerned with establishing universal laws (or essences) than in accumulating 
empirical facts of localised truth-value for pragmatic ends. Arguably, an unavoidable 
compromise in phenomenological accuracy is permissible if it renders the 
experiment practically viable and delivers scientifically valid results. As long as the 
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epoché can be said to measure the phenomenon it claims to measure (i.e., 
‘measurement validity’), the fact that participants accessed their experiences via 
memory does not invalidate the study’s findings on a scientific basis. As such, this 
branch of neurophenomenology is perhaps better judged on empirical rather than 
philosophical grounds. 
At this juncture, we should review the phenomenological findings obtained and their 
relationship with the EEG data. Like a physician, the neurophenomenological 
experimenter attends to both the patient’s verbal and non-verbal cues as potential 
indicators of unacknowledged features of (preictal) experience. These include 
speech content, gaze direction and bodily gestures. For example, when one patient 
was questioned as to why she repeatedly touched her forehead, she reported the 
experience of a “slight touch, like a breeze touching my forehead” which would 
indicate an impending seizure. Another patient verbally recalled a sensation of ‘heat’ 
that began in the stomach before spreading throughout the body. One patient noted 
a more general feeling of depression before seizure onset, while another reported 
feeling “ill at ease”.11  
The reported experiences were sub-divided into three categories: synchronic, 
diachronic and functional. Experiential invariances were codified for the purpose of 
extracting an essential feature of the experience. Here, one epistemological feature 
of phenomenology arguably makes for a bedfellow with neuroscientific practice. 
Specifically, that phenomenology aims to disclose “essential, organizing patterns” of 
experience (Parnas and Bovet, 1995) rather than its fleeting ‘contents’. Likewise, the 
cognitive neuroscientist aims to establish a firmly consistent relationship between 
 
11 This procedure was replicated to target experiences characteristic of the seizure itself, though these 
findings are not relevant here. 
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brain organisation and cognition-experience. Thus, Petitmengin (2009) translates 
individual descriptions of experience into signifiers of categories: “I am looking at the 
scene with my own eyes” becomes “first-person perceptual position”; “that morning I 
felt fragile” becomes “negative internal state”. As categorical experiences, these 
experiences can be said to categorise the preictal stage at the phenomenological 
level.  
Subsequent to categorisation, it was demonstrated that, while ictal experiences were 
experientially ‘positive’ in character (i.e., motor, sensory or verbal hyper-activity), 
preictal experiences were ‘negative’ in character, associating with reduced energy, 
vitality, language ability, concentration or balance. The most commonly reported 
experiences associated with the preictal stage were “tiredness”, “weakness”, “lack of 
energy” and “fragility” (n=4). The second most commonly described was distress 
(n=3). Of less reported frequency were “headaches”, “clumsiness” and 
“hypersensitivity to light” (n=2). These data supported the conclusion that the 
decrease in phase synchrony (desynchronisation) that characterises the preictal 
stage as a neurological event has ‘negative’ experiences as its experiential correlate. 
By contrast, the ’positive’ and sudden character of the experiences related to the 
seizure itself (‘ictal stage’) corresponded with neurophysiological hyper-
synchronisation.  
The central research question: “do the neuro-electric preictal modifications identified 
among epileptic patients correspond to modifications in their subjective experience?” 
was seemingly answerable in the affirmative. The neuro-dynamic and 
phenomenological methods employed permitted a correlation between ‘objective’ 
and ‘subjective’ datasets. But on which plane can a correlation be established? 
Northoff (2015) asserts that spatio-temporality can serve as ‘common currency’ 
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between the phenomenal and the neurological domains. A philosophically modest 
but pragmatic interpretation of this dictum holds that both experiential and 
neurophysiological data can be chronometrically aligned. In other words, it is 
justifiable to hypothesise that when invariant experiential profiles and invariant 
neurophysiological profiles arise and withdraw in synchronisation, they can be 
judged as related in some capacity. One of the most striking empirical findings 
garnered by applying this logic to both datasets was that events at the 
phenomenological and neurological levels appeared to be temporally mismatched: 
the decrease of neuronal synchronisation occurs a few minutes before the seizure, 
whereas the state of fragility that seems to characterise the preictal period is felt several 
hours before the seizure (Petitmengin 2009). 
 
Seemingly, the preictal stage’s characteristically ‘negative’ experiential profile 
preceded its neurological counterpart by a significant margin. This temporal 
mismatch contained useful implications for further investigative work; specifically, it 
indicated that the neuroimaging component of the study should expand the frontier of 
its timeline in line with the phenomenological data. 
 
Thus, a sample of five patients who had already been subject to 24h EEG 
recordings, for a collective accumulation of 305 hours, had their EEG recordings 
reanalysed on a broader timescale. Within this timespan, 50 separate seizures were 
evaluated. In support of the phenomenological findings, it was subsequently found 
that distinctive neurophysiological markers of the preictal stage were detectable five 
hours before seizure onset, not five minutes as originally hypothesised. It was 
observed that the neuronal populations surrounding the epileptic focus underwent 
their characteristic process of desynchronisation significantly earlier than the 
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neuroimaging work had initially shown (Le Van Queyen et al. 2005). Thus, the 
phenomenological markers of the preictal stage, obtained by the experimental 
epoché, enabled the researchers to detect commensurate neurological markers long 
before they were initially assumed to have emerged.  
 
VI. Scientific Implications 
 
Haslam and McGarty (2014) provide four criteria according to which all psychological 
experiments are allegedly assessable: description, prediction, explanation, and 
application. The case for the experiments assessed here featuring descriptive value 
in their obtainment of novel phenomenological and neurophysiological profiles is 
largely self-evident. However, the explanatory significance (and specific 
explanandum) of a neurophenomenological experiment is less transparent. What 
exactly does an E-NP design endeavour to explain? Assuming a (controversial) 
naturalistic position, preictal experience (e.g., ‘fragility’) can be explained through 
recourse to preictal neurological desynchronisation: the neurological activity causes 
the experience.  
 
Notwithstanding the phenomenological impasse inherent to introducing causality 
(see below), ‘explaining’ preictal experience was hardly a motivating factor to begin 
with; through the neuro-dynamic method, Le Van Quyen et al. (2001b) only 
discovered the preictal stage due to a broader initiative aimed at improving the early 
detectability of epileptic seizures. Disclosing the preictal stage’s experiential 
correlate was predominately in service of alerting patients to an imminent seizure 
and helping clinicians in developing effective countermeasures. This pursuit was 
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essentially open-ended and therefore no causal hypothesis required any 
confirmation. Moreover, unlike other neuroscientific experiments, the specific 
relationship between brain and experience under investigation was not amenable to 
experimental influence. Neither preictal experience nor neural activity were 
manipulated, so the experiment measured each profile as it occurred without much 
interference.  
 
Therefore, the series of studies assessed in Petitmengin’s (2009) meta-review 
perhaps perform best if they are graded under the criteria of ‘prediction’ and 
‘application’. Predictive validity denotes a type of ‘external’ validity that is satisfied 
whereupon experimental findings facilitate a prediction that is both accurate and 
theoretically consistent with the original results. If the original results are robust, 
theoretical analysis can mould the data into further avenues of (testable) speculation.  
In this instance, an empirically testable prediction was proposed that the 
neurophysiological process of preictal desynchronisation would emerge earlier than 
five minutes before seizure onset. Supporting this speculation was that discovery 
that preictal experiences reportedly emerged several hours before seizure onset. 
Thus, a discovery at the phenomenological level accurately predicted a subsequent 
discovery at the neurophysiological level.  
This prediction’s subsequent experimental confirmation bolsters the purported (local) 
association between preictal experience and preictal desynchronisation and, on a 
broader plane, the global association between neurophysiological data and the kind 
of experience captured by the experimental epoché.  Further supporting evidence 
arrived by way of the seemingly successful application of the Paris group’s findings 
to the development of therapeutic interventions. Recall that a primary motivation 
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behind their inquiry was that of conferring to patients an enhanced ability for 
recognising an impending seizure through optimising patient’s awareness of 
experiences characteristic of its preceding preictal stage. Petitmengin (2009) notes 
that “refined interview techniques” designed to guide patients towards the recognition 
of an approaching seizure were developed from the neurophenomenological data. 
Additionally, biofeedback devices that “facilitate the awareness of premonitory 
sensations and the setting up of counter-measures” were also developed (Nagai 
2014).  
Finally, two interrelated criticisms on scientific grounds should be highlighted. The 
first weakness relates to the study’s small sample size. The initial sample size for the 
phenomenological component of the study included 9 participants. As three patients 
failed to reliably recall preictal experiences, the investigation was limited to an even 
smaller sample size of 6. While this number is far below the recommended minimum 
of n=22 for a within-subject experimental design (Baker et al. 2020), such a small 
sample size is not unusual for investigations that are unable to draw upon the normal 
population. Baker et al. recommend that to mitigate this weakness, such studies 
should increase their number of trials, which is presumably why Petitmengin (2009) 
interviewed all subjects “at least twice”. 
 
A second, related consideration concerns the fact that there has not yet been an 
attempt to replicate the full spectrum of experimental procedures reviewed in 
Petitmengin (2009). The most likely reason for this is that the procedures 
implemented are theoretically and practically complicated and took many years and 
several researchers for them to come to fruition. As the name suggests, intracranial 
recordings necessitate that electrodes are placed inside the patient’s skull, which 
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entails a surgical procedure. This practice is subject to incredibly stringent ethical 
guidelines (Sahuhquillo & Biestro 2014).  
 
Thus, any full replication of the neurophenomenological findings would first entail a 
lengthy neuro-dynamic analysis to confirm the preictal stage before finding several 
patients who were willing to undergo a lengthy and invasive procedure. Though the 
difficulty with which the results were obtained is perhaps deserving of praise, 
experimental neurophenomenologists should, where possible, aim to make their 
studies as easy to replicate as possible, to avoid E-NP being something of an insular 
practice. 
 
VII. Phenomenological Implications 
The experimental epoché is susceptible for criticism on phenomenological grounds 
insofar as the phenomenological data were taken from experiences as recalled via 
memory. However, this feature is not emblematic of E-NP generally and was 
instituted based on factors unique to epilepsy. Extracting qualitative data from 
patients for whom an epileptic seizure is imminent is extraordinarily difficult; seizures 
often arrive unexpectedly, and patients may understandably wish to take 
precautionary measures rather than partake in data-collection.  
Nonetheless, even attempts to ground phenomenology in mathematics maintain a 
fundamental distinction between immediate experience and remembered experience 
(Roy et al. 1999). The act of remembering previously immediate, pre-reflective 
experiences, through the oft-transformative filter of long-term memory, while 
reporting them to an experimenter, encompasses a rather complex temporal 
structure that the study ultimately glosses over.  
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A purely phenomenological investigation could not afford to misidentify an 
experience as it is immediately given in the present moment with how it is refracted 
and reconstructed through memory; what might be loosely termed 
‘phenomenological accuracy’ is an integral aspect to what Husserl wanted to achieve 
with the epoché. To attest to the validity of the epoché’s results, we must instead 
pivot to their scientific value.  
Indeed, there are persuasive empirical justifications for accepting the 
phenomenological descriptions qua experimental data, e.g., that the effect was 
observed in several patients in more than one trial, that it predicted a subsequent 
empirical discovery and informed therapeutic measures, etc. The experimental 
instantiation of neurophenomenology may thus occasionally require sacrifices in 
phenomenological accuracy to the altar of experimental viability. If so, the particulars 
of this sacrifice shall likely depend on the population under investigation. It is easy to 
imagine how an experiment conducted during a hallucination, a manic episode may 
necessitate modifications to the epoché, though of a different kind. 
Another methodological question to consider is whether the operationalised epoché 
is appropriate for capturing the type of ‘experiential correlate’ that this study sought 
to disclose. It can be argued that the undeniably physiological underpinnings of a 
seizure, and the clinical benefit inherent to profiling it, endorse it as an exemplary 
candidate for experimental neurophenomenology. Experiences that characterise an 
epileptic seizure seemingly suffer little from being uprooted from their meaningful 
place in an ecological context. An epileptic seizure is an inherently disruptive event, 
temporarily subsuming all other aspects of brain functionality. Furthermore, its 
suddenness and rarity ensure it is perhaps less coherently integrated into one’s 
selfhood when compared with other psychological phenomena (e.g., biographical 
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history, aesthetic preference, unconscious motivation) or even disorders such as 
schizophrenia and bipolar.  
E-NP is seemingly better tailored to studies in which intricate forms of intentional 
comportment (such as the case of Schneider) play a less prominent role; this way, a 
clear and parsimonious relationship between neural activity and experience can be 
exhibited. However, some of the phenomenological data did indicate the existence of 
a somewhat more complex intentional relationship indicative of the preictal stage. 
The preictal stage’s emergence seemingly accompanies a more fundamental shift in 
the agent’s intentional orientation, which Petitmengin (2009) claims “seems to 
correspond to a deep modification of patient’s relationship to self and world”.  
For instance, one patient reported a kind of depressive-existential malaise: “[the 
experience] is rather negative because all of a sudden I realise the absurdity of what 
we are, of what we do… [this indicates] I am very likely to have a seizure”. Less 
frequently, patients also reported an unplaceable sense of contentment with regards 
this growing sense of detachment: “I feel a sort of pleasure falling into the 
seizure…the pleasure of someone who has dropped everything… who is finally 
going to recover the freedom of everything.” 
Adopting a model of linear causality, we might claim that the oncoming epileptic 
seizure causes these profound background-intentional modifications. Though this 
conclusion is in-keeping with some epistemological tenets of cognitive neuroscience, 
it is nevertheless disfavoured by both canonical phenomenologists and 
neurophenomenologists. Varela’s own position was marked by a committed anti-
foundationalism, ultimately privileging neither the brain nor experience (Bitbol 2012).  
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How then might the relationship between brain and experience be conceptualised 
neurophenomenologically? Heidegger’s notion of a ‘world-disclosing’ Mood 
(Stimmung) may be more appropriate; a mood represents no explicit object, but 
filters the way things (ourselves, others, the absurdity of life) show themselves to us. 
Both depression and contentment, which accompanied the experience of growing 
detachment concurrent with the preictal stage, are not fleeting qualia but present the 
world to individuals in a particular configuration. These results highlight the complex 
and multifaceted constitution of the agent’s relationship to self and world and, more 
generally, the persisting difficulty in carving out any single causal relationship in 
neuroscience. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Disclosing new experiential categories is of particular utility to clinical instantiations 
of neuroscientific research, where such phenomena have a pronounced diagnostic 
utility. We cannot infer either the joyful or melancholic experiences associated with 
preictal desynchronisation from the neuroimaging data alone; instead, a specific 
methodology like the experimental epoché is required to measure this dimension 
accurately.  
This highlights how, as Petitmengin concludes at the end of the paper, “instant after 
instant, the scission between self and world is created and maintained”. Adopters of 
E-NP must be attentive to the fact that a neurological profile’s cognitive-experiential 
correlate may not be limited to ‘simple’ sensations and thus must remain sensitive to 
more ‘global’ shifts in intentionality. These complex intentional relationships, (i.e., a 
rising sense of life’s absurdity) is equally indicative of a characteristic pattern of brain 
activity as are ‘tiredness’ or ‘lack of energy’. 
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In sum, the example of E-NP research analysed here managed to uncover a robust 
correlation between designated sets of experiences (positive; negative) and specific 
patterns of neural activity (desynchronisation or hyper-synchronisation of the 
epileptic focus). Prior qualitative investigations into the prodromal stage of a seizure 
had not produced such data, implying E-NP can indeed disclose unique experiential 
categories. The operationalised epoché aided participants in attaining reflective 
awareness of the preictal stage’s experiential correlate and enabled them to 
verbalise it. Once profiled, its emergence was detected at an earlier point than 
originally assumed. By implication, we might speculate to the existence of several 
unrecognised phenomenological and neurological profiles that are of equal difficultly 
to detect. As an experimental design, we can expect that E-NP will likely be altered, 












Chapter 3. Constitutive Neurophenomenology: Empathy 
I. Introduction 
Constitutive neurophenomenology (C-NP) is distinguishable in two ways. The first 
pertains to the extended width of its scope: C-NP draws upon an eclectic array of 
material and is not anchored to explicating any particular study or dataset. The 
second pertains to C-NP’s emphasis on articulating a positively-framed definition of 
its subject matter as a research goal. However, this begs the further question of how 
researchers should frame the ‘subject matter’ that constitutive neurophenomenology 
‘defines’. Correctly designating C-NP’s object of inquiry entails convincingly 
negotiating the points of convergence between neuroscience and phenomenology at 
a broad scale. 
A fully satisfying analysis of this question on epistemological and metaphysical 
grounds is beyond the scope of the present analysis and has been discussed 
elsewhere (Keen 1975; Osborne 1994). Instead, we will reorient towards a more 
practical plane by underlining the purpose of a contemporary cognitive 
neuroscientific model, before determining if a neurophenomenological approach fits 
the bill. In their analysis of multisensory integration, Fujisaki, Kitazawa and Nishida 
(2012) claim that a neuroscientific model should coherently unify three dimensions: 
the objective, the subjective and the neurological. Under this framework, lived 
experience, the brain, and environment each constitute part of an interrelated object 
of inquiry. Where this objective-subjective-neurological phenomenon (i.e., memory, 
language, perception) converges might be termed an ‘aspect of consciousness’ 
(Frankish and Ramsey 2012) or, more succinctly, a ‘cognitive domain’. 
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Further clarification of C-NP’s aim can be made by comparison with other meta-
theoretical approaches, including evolutionary psychology, computationalism and 
Bayesianism. At one level, evolutionary psychology mirrors interpretative 
neurophenomenology by explaining experimental findings through the provision of a 
conceptual framework. Experimenters can invoke evolutionary psychology (and by 
extension evolutionary biology) as an on-hand framework poised to elucidate 
particular empirical findings. For instance, the existence of specialised mechanisms 
for detecting looming (approaching) objects, both visually and audibly (Neuhoff 1998; 
Grassi 2010), has been explained through recourse to the mechanism’s adaptive 
function. The interpretation holds that it privileges on-coming, potentially dangerous 
objects and animals (an approaching lion, a falling rock) and is thus explained by a 
phylogenetic adaption imparting its signature in the human brain. 
However, the evolutionary psychologist may expand their horizon by proposing an 
evolutionary model of a broadly-defined ‘cognitive domain’ (multisensory perception, 
memory, decision-making), cohesively encompassing the domain’s constituent 
elements accordance with a conceptual framework. In turn, this permits the 
formulation of an operational definition of ‘cognitive domain X’ according to a 
faithfully evolutionary perspective. For instance, in modelling the cognitive domain of 
social cognition, Neuberg and Schaller (2015) “articulate the logical foundations of 
social cognition [and] discuss the ways in which social cognition is inherently 
[evolutionarily] motivated social cognition” [emphasis added].  
Computationalism also features both an interpretative and ‘constitutive’ function, 
either providing a lexicon to describe ‘cognitive operations’ or modelling a cognitive 
domain according to select principles. A computational account of X transfers 
neurological events into cognitive events by employing computer-based and 
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information-processing metaphors (Barrett 2012). Hypothetically, this kind of 
modelling can ascend up to endowing ontological status to the mind or brain itself in 
accordance with a particular framework. Examples include The Computational Brain 
(Churchland 2016) and the edited collection The Bayesian Brain (Doya, Ishii, Pouget 
& Rao 2007). Such accounts assimilate theoretical and empirical literature to define 
mind and brain according to computational (the brain is inherently an information-
processing and storage system) or Bayesian (the brain is inherently a future-
orientated probability calculating system) principles, respectively.  
Thus, in C-NP, the phenomenological contribution mirrors evolutionary, 
computational or Bayesian neuroscience, which thread together the objective, 
neurological and subjective elements of a cognitive domain according to the 
assumed principles of a meta-theoretical framework. For our purposes, we do not 
wish to evaluate the momentous task of defining the brain itself according to 
phenomenological principles.12 Instead, to elucidate how C-NP can model a 
cognitive domain in neurophenomenological terms, we will turn to the exemplar 
represented by mirror neuron (MN) research and the cognitive domain of empathy. 
Unlike, for instance, an evolutionary model of empathy, neurophenomenology is 
uninterested in adopting causal reasoning to determine empathy’s ‘origin’ or 
‘reproductive value’ and will instead model empathy in correspondence with 
phenomenological analysis and experimental findings in MN research. 
Phenomenology’s heightened receptivity to the structural foundations of experience 
expedites the merger between the objective, subjective and neurological levels into a 
cohesive model. Phenomenological experience should not be confused with ‘life 
 
12 Perhaps the closest any author has come to attempting this is in Thompson’s (2007) ‘Mind in Life’. 
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experience’ in the biographical sense, e.g., ‘negative life experiences can activate a 
predisposition to schizophrenia’. Experience for neurophenomenology is neither 
biography nor ‘mere subjectivity’: an epistemologically dubious account of 
unfalsifiable introspection (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Properly wielded, experiential 
descriptors can provide vital information about brain functionality and disclose 
testable properties of the brain to help researchers understand the nature of the 
phenomenon they are investigating.  
II. Mirror Neurons and Empathy 
The driving impetus for the cross-disciplinary approach analysed here emerged 
when technology-driven insights provided by neuroimaging apparently 
complemented earlier phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity. Mirror neurons 
(MNs) were discovered in the brains of macaque monkeys in the format of single-cell 
recordings using intracranial electrodes (Rizzolatti et al. 1996). Neuroscientific 
evidence for the existence of MNs is supported by studies using MEG (Hari et al. 
1998), EEG (Cochin et al. 1999) and fMRI (Chong et al. 2008).  
MNs are localised to the ventral premotor and posterior parietal cortices and 
acquired their name because they appeared to emulate patterns of neural activity 
occurrent in brains of an observed party (Gallese et al. 1996). In brief, when the 
agent observes cognitive, behavioural, or affective states in another person, neurons 
in the observer’s brain will replicate patterns of activity occurring in the brain of the 
other. For example, neurons will fire in the pars opercularis when the agent both 
experiences anger and observes anger in another (Carr et al. 2003).  
Notably, any strictly physiological exposition of mirror neurons becomes quite quickly 
exhausted. A substantial overview of MNs must make mention of the cognitive 
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domains of emotion, perception, action and so forth, which have been traditionally 
elucidated with psychological tools and, of course, by phenomenological tools also. 
Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of a neuroscientific discovery, it is taken as a 
matter of course that the neuroimaging data per se constitutes only half of a 
complete picture. Conceptual insights into cognition are subsequently enlisted to 
help ascertain which aspects of ‘mind’ a neural region or class of neurons relate to. 
Thus, as with many neuroscientific discoveries, the properties of mirror neurons were 
initially extrapolated by pivoting to a folk-psychological understanding of mind.  
Indeed, the preliminary coupling of mirror neurons with empathy was quite common-
sensical. Whether or not my mirror neurons fire in my brain depends on what I see 
the other do. Furthermore, where these neurons fire in my brain depends upon 
where they fire in the other’s brain. When a connection is established between self 
and other, particularly if it is a connection based upon understanding, such a 
phenomenon is typically termed ‘empathy’. So far, so simple: the classification of 
MNs as empathy-related neurons satisfies the criterion of ‘face validity’, the 
superficial assessment of whether or not the construct describes what it claims to 
describe. Indeed, few scholars have denied that mirror neurons are connected with 
empathy, even if some (e.g., Hickock 2014) have downplayed their pivotal role. As 
the experimental data accumulates, however, an increasingly sophisticated account 
of the cognitive domain under examination, beyond that of folk-psychology, becomes 
increasingly essential. The claim ‘mirror neurons facilitate empathy’ thus leads 
directly onto the thorny issue of having to comprehensively define empathy.  
MNs are implicated in the understanding of others because they appear to be 
receptive to the goals and intentions of an observed party. How then should the 
relevant literature conceptualise this phenomenon? Rizzolatti et al. (2009) critically 
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note: “it has been assumed that the understanding of actions performed by others 
depends on inferential reasoning”. While a genealogical analysis regarding this 
assumption’s origins are not of interest here, suffice it to say that it did not fall out of 
the sky. Indeed, a prevalent model of empathy contemporaneous with the discovery 
of mirror neurons was the ‘theory-of-mind’ model (Preemack & Woodruff 1978). The 
APA defines ToM as “the ability to imagine or make deductions about the mental 
states of other individuals” (American Psychological Association, 2009, p. 520). 
However, the problem with utilising the ToM model of empathy was that it apparently 
corresponded poorly with the properties exhibited by MNs. Theory-of-mind 
conceptualises empathic understanding as the product of acts of interpretation 
(hence the term ‘theory’). By contrast, MNs fire during the agent’s perception of the 
other, in parts of the brain that parallel the other’s brain. As Gallagher and Zahavi 
(2012) note, this all happens far too quickly to involve any cognitively complex act of 
reflective thought. MNs seemingly activate immediately and involuntarily as soon as 
the other’s actions are perceived. 
A treatment of empathy seemingly more cohesive with MNs, however, was 
discovered in accounts provided by phenomenological philosophers. 
Phenomenology adopts a somewhat ‘heavy-duty’ approach to the intricacies of 
experience, even though, unlike subsequent computational accounts, it was not 
initially developed in communication with modern neuroscience. Nonetheless, years 
of accumulated experimental data, alongside their philosophical interpretations, have 
enabled the progressive formulation of what might be called a 
neurophenomenological model of empathy. This model conceptualises empathy 
from the ground-up according to its mutually informative phenomenological 
(‘cognitive’) and neurophysiological dimensions. 
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According to Iacaboni (2008), the claim that phenomenology directly informed the 
interpretation of MNs is quite straightforwardly validated:  
Gallese was digging into Merleau-Ponty’s work, finding the appropriate analogies between 
philosophy and neuroscience, explaining the group’s discoveries in less scientific and 
more philosophical terms (2008, p.16). 
The phrase “more philosophical” simply denotes that the empirical findings were 
translated into the language of phenomenology. Gallese first adopted the procedure 
outlined in chapter one, whereby an experimental finding lacking proper expression 
from within an existing conceptual paradigm is explicated by cross-referencing it with 
a phenomenological paradigm. However, we know that constitutive 
neurophenomenology can expand its horizon further than this act of experimental 
contextualisation and refocus its attention toward the broader ‘cognitive domain’ in 
question. 
It should not be taken for granted that folk-psychological or behavioural accounts of 
empathy accurately or exhaustively capture what is imparted by the empirical data. 
In this case, building a comprehensive model of MN functionality hinges on providing 
an ‘operational definition’ of the broader phenomenon of empathy. What several 
philosophers and neuroscientists have attempted since the discovery of MNs is to 
integrate experimental data and phenomenological descriptions toward the goal of 
classifying empathy according to its neuro-phenomenological attributes. 
Consequently, this classification, provided it is plausible, should have ramifications 
for how empathy is treated across the cognitive sciences.  
III. Defining Empathy 
As Batson (2011) illustrates, researchers “agree empathy is important but often 
disagree about what effects it has and what it is”. Similarly, Zahavi and Michael 
76 
 
(2018) claim: “when considering the current debate on empathy, it quickly becomes 
evident that a diversity of definitions of are available, and no consensus seems 
forthcoming”. However, Gallagher and Zahavi (2012, p.203) suggest that “any 
intentional act that discloses the other’s subjectivity counts as empathy”. By 
operationalising this expansive definition of empathy, we can examine MN research 
in conjunction with both a generalised phenomenological approach to empathy, as 
well as with fine-grained descriptions of specific manifestations of empathic acts 
provided by individual phenomenologists.  
Through merging phenomenological description with neurophysiological data into a 
unified account, the constitutive neurophenomenologist must uncover some of the 
defining elements of empathy and propose (within the logic of the model) what 
exactly empathy ‘is’. To understand how such an integration is possible, we will 
consider three broad convergence points that seemingly unite the phenomenological 
and MN-derived approach to empathy: 1) Direct access, 2) Primacy and 3) 
Embodiment. 
III.i Direct Access  
From Husserl onwards, a unifying theme in phenomenological philosophy is the 
notion that human beings can understand their world ‘directly’, without the need for 
theoretical engagement. In an intersubjective context, our absorption into social 
worlds of shared meaning ensures that we can (for the most part) accurately 
understand those who co-inhabit it with us without applying conceptual explanations 
to their behaviour. Much of the secondary literature surrounding Husserl’s 
phenomenology of empathy surrounds debates on whether empathy is indeed 
directed and unmediated (Zahavi 1996); Zahavi (2012) suggests such a view is 
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ultimately justified. Indeed, for Husserl, perceptual intending offers a more direct and 
accurate way for the agent to know the intentional ‘object’ as compared with 
representational forms of knowledge provided by signitive and pictorial intending. 
Following this logic, in perceiving the other formulate an expression, gesture, or 
action, I am immanently presented with that action’s significance.  
Such a sentiment evokes Wittgenstein’s claim that “we see emotions – we do not 
see facial contortions and make an inference from them (like a doctor making a 
diagnosis)” (1967, p.225). However, an interlocutor may contend that this view of 
empathy is appropriate for when the agent must understand affective states, but 
cannot extend to so-called ‘cognitive states’, i.e., the other’s intentions, desires, or 
motivations, which are allegedly hidden from view ‘inside’ the other’s mind. It 
appears intuitively plausible that one directly perceives the sadness, apprehension or 
joy in the other, yet must infer their intentions, desires and motivations. Recognising 
these discrete modalities of social understanding, a growing body of literature 
differentiates between cognitive and emotional empathy (Smith 2006), with ToM 
postulated to explain the former.  
Could ‘emotional empathy’ – an immediate, contagion-like simulation of witnessed 
affective states – be best articulated by appealing to some kind of immediate access, 
while ‘cognitive empathy’ – the understanding of other’s intentions and motivations - 
be solely explained by a theory-like mechanism?13 While such a distinction has 
merit, several experimental procedures have indicated that MNs are highly 
implicated in acts defined as cognitive empathy. According to these interpretations, 
the agent readily understands (particular instances of) the other’s cognitive state 
 
13 Zahavi (2012) argues Lipps’ (1900) phenomenology of empathy is appropriate for understanding 
what contemporary psychologist’s call ‘emotional contagion’. 
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when directly observing their actions. While the terminological employment ‘cognitive 
empathy’ is disfavoured by phenomenologists, what it denotes (understanding the 
other’s intentionality) has been the subject of several in-depth phenomenological 
examinations. 
What neurophysiological evidence supports the notion that ‘cognitive empathy’ is 
constituted by some kind of ‘direct access’ to the other’s mind? Early in the history of 
mirror neuron research, Gallese et al. (1996) discovered that MNs do not activate 
upon observation of movements that merely mimic goal-directed actions. MNs are 
seemingly ‘aware’ of whether or not an action features a ‘real’ intentional referent 
and fail to activate upon observation of merely ‘pantomimed’ actions. It then follows 
that the brain can understand the intentional-directedness (or lack thereof) of an 
authentically goal-directed movement before conscious reflection designates it as 
such. It was hypothesised that MNs favour concrete, goal-directed movements 
because these movements disclose ‘real’ information about the other’s intentionality, 
whereas pantomimed movements do not.  
Thus, the Gallese et al. (1996) study provided early evidence that cognitive empathy 
need not (always) recruit a reflective cognitive procedure that adds conceptual 
content onto the raw data of visual perception. Through successive experimental 
manipulations, the extent to which MNs are responsive to cognitive states (and not 
just physical movements) has been explored. Behavioural studies had already found 
that, when asked to imitate actions, children often imitate the goals of actions instead 
of mimicking the precise movement itself, even without instruction (Bekkering et al. 
2000). Using fMRI as a measure, Koski et al. (2002) replicated this paradigm with 
adults. They found that MNs in Broca’s area exhibited a stronger activation when 
participants observed seemingly goal-directed movements, even if this goal was only 
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implicit (i.e., a finger covering a dot). Similarly, Molnar-Szackas et al. (2005) found 
stronger MN activation in conditions where participants observed ‘structured’ actions 
(cups being arranged in size order) compared with ‘unstructured’ actions (cups being 
arranged randomly).  
Furthermore, MNs are not only receptive to the ‘local’ goal of an action (e.g., picking 
up a cup to drink) but to its ‘global’ context as well. One experimental manipulation 
(Iacoboni 2004a) had participants watch video recordings that featured three 
conditions. In each recording, a different scenario was presented: ‘grasping actions’, 
‘contextual grasping actions’ and ‘context only’. As measured by fMRI, MNs 
exhibited their strongest response when witnessing the contextual grasping 
condition, implying that MNs account for the contextual setting in which an 
intentional-action is embedded, automatically prioritising ecologically congruent 
actions. This is likely because contextual actions disclose the most pertinent 
information about the observed party’s intentions. Iacoboni (2004) asserts that these 
findings attest to an underappreciated ‘holism’ of brain functionality, in which action, 
intention and context are comprehended directly and simultaneously instead of being 
cobbled together by a sequential reasoning process.  
These data suggest that the intensity of MN activity positively correlates with how 
‘purposeful’ a perceived action is. Mirror neurons seemingly display preferences for 
activities reflective of an observed agent’s intentionality, which translates into an 
empathic ability to understand their ‘cognitive state’ directly. Owing to an automatic, 
MN-enabled pairing between two agents, the observer can be said to understand the 
other’s goals and intentions with an immediacy and accuracy comparable with other 
perceptually-accessed ‘objects’. Consequently, in addition to MNs mirroring the 
where of the other’s brain, MNs help agents understand the why of perceived 
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actions, with each constituting an essential component of the neurological response 
to social experience. 
Which further details to this picture can be provided by consulting the 
phenomenological literature? Zahavi (2012) formulates Husserl’s position on 
empathy as articulated in Ideas II thusly: 
If I talk with another [and] look him in the eyes, I have the liveliest experience of 
his immediate presence. I am justified in saying that I “see him” qua person, 
and not merely qua body. 
 
What are the necessary conditions for seeing the other qua person instead of qua 
body? While there is a separate, quasi-ethical element to seeing “the person”,14 part 
of seeing a person and (not just a spatially extended meat-sack) involves seeing 
(and therefore understanding) their intentions and motivations. This notion seems to 
corroborate MN evidence suggestive that agents have comparable access to a 
movement’s intended goal as to the physical motion itself; thus, by seeing the 
movement (body) agents simultaneously see the intention (person). Therefore, in 
perceiving the other in propria persona, I instantaneously disclose his intentional 
comportment without applying theoretical explanations of his intentionality to sensory 
perceptions of his form.  
In Zahavi’s interpretation of Husserl, this direct access to the other’s personhood 
constitutes the “appresentation of the other”, whereby absent profiles of intentionality 
are perceptually presented alongside their material body (Zahavi 2008). I am always 
(ap)presented with the other’s acting as an acting-for-something: “the running of the 
other in the forest as flight, the hiding behind a stone as a protection from missiles,” 
(Zahavi 2012). Although appresentation provides me with a profile of the other’s 
 
14 See Levinas (1987). 
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personhood somewhat indirectly, it is nonetheless provided perceptually, not 
theoretically. On phenomenological grounds, there is little reason to presume I first 
perceive the physical movement of running, then include the forest as context, then 
posit the intention as flight: each element is experienced simultaneously, as Iacoboni 
(2006) surmised. For Husserl, I am equally capable of direct perceptual access 
(which, under certain circumstances, features epistemological weight) to the other’s 
personhood (‘cognition’) as to their physicality. 
However, MN evidence indicates that there is also a powerfully enactive component 
to person-perception in which the motor cortex plays a significant role. How this 
component co-constitutes empathy can be further developed with recourse to 
Heidegger. Heidegger’s notion of ‘primordial understanding’, especially as 
interpreted by Dreyfus (1991), fleshes out the phenomenological distinction between 
understanding, taken as practical know-how, and interpretation, taken as theoretical 
knowledge. On this account, understanding is pre-theoretical and practical, while 
interpretation is theoretical and disengaged. Applying this distinction to empathy, it is 
arguable that to understand the other (as opposed to interpreting them) the agent 
must be capable of partaking in co-operative activity without drawing upon reflective 
deliberation. Neurophysiologically, the phenomenon of enactive understanding 
accompanies a MN-assisted merging of intentional orientation between agents and 
allows for “synchronic motor activity [that] fosters social connection” (Iacoboni 2008). 
Merleau-Ponty (1945, p.361) prophetically described this phenomenon as like “the 
other’s intention inhabiting my body and mine his”.  
This ‘shared motor-intentionality’ supports the hypothesised existence of a mode of 
social understanding that makes the other directly intelligible so that social 
interactions need not involve acts of calculated reasoning. Indeed, this “shared 
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inhabitancy of intentionality” enables a spontaneous, pre-reflective response within a 
socially appropriate framework to arise in the observer. Therefore, the MN system’s 
motor component helps the agent understand genuine, goal-directed movements 
and readies them to respond accordingly before reflective judgement takes hold.15 
This leads onto the question of how the agent perceives the ‘non-human’ 
environment, considering that the other’s perspective always exists as a constitutive 
element. As Iacoboni et al. (2004a) demonstrated, MNs are receptive to the 
contextual cues provided by non-human objects when observing human action. 
Another class of neurons known as ‘canonical neurons’ will further illuminate this 
interrelationship between self, others and objects. 
Canonical neurons resemble mirror neurons insofar as both are visuo-motor neurons 
that occupy area F5 of the brain (Gallese et al. 1996). Canonical neurons usually 
activate upon the agent’s perception of graspable three-dimensional objects but, 
crucially, cease their activity if another person reaches toward them. Therefore, a 
static object’s neurological (and phenomenological) correlate depends significantly 
on whether or not that object features as a motor-possibility for an observed party. 
Iacoboni (2004) approvingly cites Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) concept of the intentional 
arc and his claim that grasping actions are “magically complete” from the outset 
because the intended-object suddenly “belongs to” the grasping motion. Again, the 
brain seemingly recognises this ‘for-the-otherness’ as a ‘property’ of the object 
without reflectively interpreting it as such. As phenomenologists had previously 
suggested, our perception of objects incorporates an ever-present understanding 
that these objects also exist for the other, from their perspective. As Iacoboni (2004) 
 
15 Some evidence indicates that neural regions involved in context-dependent motor responses and 




states: “canonical neurons illustrates the role of (potential) action for the constitution 
of the meaning of the world”. 
For phenomenologists and MN theorists alike, ‘mirroring’ is not analogous to two 
isolated subjects establishing a temporary and fragile parallelism between each 
other before returning to some default mode of solipsism. Our pre-theoretical 
understanding of ourselves, others and objects always co-exist as constitutive 
elements of worldhood, aspects of which are neurophysiologically measurable. In 
recognition of this, Legrand and Iacoboni (2006) argue that MNs could be relabelled 
as “sharing neurons”, as they illuminate the inherently communal nature of the 
experienced world. With this in mind, the agent might be said to have as much ‘direct 
access’ to the minds of others as to their own, with the qualification that, in both 
cases, there is always the high possibility of making (and correcting) errors. 
II. Primacy 
Closely related to the hypothesis that agents can achieve direct access to the other’s 
‘cognitive state’ lies the qualification that such access constitutes a foundational 
structure for empathising acts. Undeniably, ‘direct empathy’, as previously outlined, 
cannot be the only way humans accomplish social understanding. The 
neurophenomenologist is remiss to deny the existence of all empathising acts that 
require deliberation, speculation and/or inferential reasoning. A historian combing 
through the historical records to appreciate an ancient general’s military stratagem, a 
tourist struggling to interpret foreign customs or someone recalling their friend’s 
upbringing to excuse a distasteful trait all comprise ways of understanding the 




However, for such activities to succeed, the agent must thematise the other and 
recruit higher-order reasoning, which phenomenologists and MN theorists maintain 
are only possible upon a background of unmediated, pre-theoretical intersubjectivity. 
While a C-NP model of empathy does not reject the existence of inferential methods 
of social understanding, neurophenomenologists seemingly posit an ordering of 
rank. Pre-theoretical forms of empathy are prioritised by virtue of their allegedly 
predicative characteristics because they scaffold theoretical forms of empathy. 
Indeed, phenomenologists had long relegated theoretical empathy to something of a 
subordinate status: “the other's gaze transforms me into an object, and mine him, 
only if both us withdraw into the core of our thinking nature”, (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 
p.360). Similarly, Scheler (1923/1954, p.261) claims that the “expressive unity” 
normally available in immediate social interactions only becomes divisible (and thus 
amenable to conjecture) through a deliberate “process of abstraction”.  
Returning to Heidegger’s epistemological distinction between understanding and 
interpretation, it has been claimed that interpretative acts are grounded upon more 
‘primordial’ forms of understanding (Blattner 2006). As a derivation, it follows that 
interpretative empathy is erected upon a pre-existing foundation of primordial 
empathy. According to Scheler, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, theoretical 
empathising, which must employ reflective reasoning to succeed, is preceded by 
“withdrawal into thinking”, which abstracts the immediate nature of social 
understanding. While surely invaluable for many instances of sociality, 
phenomenological and neurophysiological evidence indicates this is not the principal 
way that human beings understand one another in regular circumstances. Therefore, 
both phenomenologists and MN-theorists seek to ‘look behind’ interpretative 
modalities of empathising to its constitutive structure. 
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Indeed, this idea of ‘primacy’ is not alien to MN neuroscientists; Legrand and 
Iacoboni (2009) claim the “primary inter-subjective relation is made possible through 
the sharing of a common world, by virtue of the execution and observation of goal-
directed actions”. Gallese (2005) argues on similar grounds: "in on-line social 
transactions... by means of intentional attunement, ‘the other [is] more than a 
representational system; it becomes a person like us". MNs seemingly supply 
neuroscientific evidence for the notion of ‘primordial’ social know-how, which posits 
that agents can respond in socially appropriate ways without deliberation. By 
contrast, the other only becomes a “representational system” when regular 
interaction breaks down and I must treat the other as a present-to-hand entity 
requiring interpretation. Indeed, Rizzolatti et al. (2009) corroborate that this so-called 
“piecemeal model” of empathy is only descriptively accurate when “the behaviour of 
the observed person is difficult to interpret”.  
A further convergence point worth noting is that of voluntarism. Zahavi (2012) claims 
that “for Husserl, the most basic form of empathy [involves] the pairing of self and 
other [which is] not initiated voluntarily”. Of course, one never chooses to ‘turn on’ 
one’s mirror neurons like a light switch. MN-assisted social understanding is 
activated upon the direct perception of the other in the form of a neurophysiological 
response outside of the agent’s control and reflective awareness. Furthermore, the 
strength of MN activation correlates with the existence of intentional and contextual 
actions, as reflected in the immediate neurophysiological response, none of which 
appear to be initiated voluntarily or under executive control.  
Finally, a C-NP model of empathy, like any other, must be capable of being applied 
to and evidenced by parallel forms of research. The idea that ‘direct’ empathy 
precedes ‘indirect’ empathy has found currency in developmental and clinical 
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psychology. Though the relevant literature is too expansive for proper discussion 
here, we will give mention to some key studies. Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is 
often regarded as a social impairment disorder par excellence; it is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that individuals with ASD have repeatedly been found to display 
MN-related deficits (Hari et al. 2004). Indeed, Dapretto et al. (2006) and Willaims et 
al. (2006) found diminished MN activity during imitation tasks, while Hadjikhani et al. 
(2007) found reduced cerebral thickness in the superior parietal, temporal, and 
frontal cortices, all of which are associated with the MN system. In a metareview, 
Williams (2008) asserts “the hypotheses of a self–other matching deficit and 
impaired mirror neuron function in autism have been well supported by studies 
employing a range of methodologies”. 
 
Such evidence supports the hypothesis that disruptions in embodied, pre-reflective 
empathising acts, and the shared intentionality it otherwise facilitates, engender 
subsequent deficits in inference-based empathising. Gallagher (2001) points out that 
false belief tasks, a lynchpin of ToM, do not require participants to understand others 
whom they directly interact with, while Iacoboni (2008) points out that autism is 
diagnosable at two years of age, before ToM appears. Neurophenomenologists do 
not doubt the validity of ToM-like empathising abilities but are inclined to suppose 
their deficits are likely grounded in a more primary dysfunction located in the MN 
system. This appraisal preserves ToM as a legitimate construct but indicates that 
‘theorising’ modes of empathising are aetiologically linked to deficits in pre-




If empathy is constituted by an ability to directly understand the other’s mind upon 
perceiving their expressions and actions, empathising acts ostensibly feature a 
prominent bodily component. It is in seeing the frown, the grasp, the point, the sprint, 
as manifested in the body, that I intuit the intention intrinsic to the motion. As 
discussed, the manifestations of intersubjectivity facilitated by MNs should not be 
considered exhaustive. However, the phenomenon of ‘bodily-motor resonance’ 
emergent amongst agents partaking in embodied interactions appears foundational 
to empathic capacities generally. Developmental psychology aptly terms bodily-
motor resonance (i.e., gaze following, vocal/facial mimicry) as ‘primary 
intersubjectivity’ and there is good evidence for assuming it emerges before theory-
of-mind abilities, manifesting in infants and even neonates (Meltzoff and Moore 
1994). 
Zahavi (2012) claims that, for Husserl, “the most fundamental form of empathy is one 
that targets the somatological level”, which unfolds through an “involuntary 
associative bonding of self and other on the basis of their bodily similarity”. When 
intentional actions are witnessed, ‘associative bonding’ becomes possible through 
the medium of apperceived bodily resemblance. As noted by Gallese (2003), this 
procedure evokes Husserl’s notion of ‘pairing’ [Paruung] whereupon the perception 
of the other’s body elicits a “transfer of sense” of their “mental state” (Husserl 
1931/1988, p.111). De Preester (2008) describes this phenomenon aptly as the 
mapping of the other’s Korper onto my Leib. That is, the physical body of the 
observed party renounces its status as a mere material object and becomes 
integrated into the observer’s field of first-person experience.  
Indeed, supporting Husserl’s claim that ‘associative bonding’ is both somatic and 
non-volitional, Gallese et al. (2012) argue that motor resonance “allows a direct 
88 
 
comprehension of others’ goals and motor-intentions, enabling an embodied link 
between individuals”. In neurophysiological terms, a distinct pattern of neural activity 
unfolding in the other’s brain is, on my perception of them, replicated in my own 
brain. Arguably, this direct understanding of the other’s intentionality perhaps mirrors 
the immediacy with which I grasp my own intentional experiences. Consequently, the 
other’s motor-intentionality newly co-constitutes my own first-person experience, and 
vice versa. In the midst of this phenomenon, the other is not ‘represented’ as a 
construct but presented as a person qua person and, on this basis, socially 
meaningful forms of co-operation are presented. Intentionality is therefore seldomly a 
private affair, but something intimately entangled with the intentionality of the other 
and facilitated by face-to-face embodied interactions. 
Merleau-Ponty (1945) develops this line of thought with his notion of 
‘intercorporeality’, which argues that bodily motor-resonance not only renders the 
other comprehensible but allows certain affording-features of the environment to 
become manifest, disclosing the world as a place where objects and actions are 
infused with collective meaning. Embodied interactions with beings sharing our 
bodily constitution serve to structure one’s sensorimotor openings to the world 
because they showcase the world as a place for particular actions. Thereafter, what 
one learns from observing the other act upon the world becomes sedimented into 
one’s practical social know-how. Consequently, an action’s meaning can then be 
understood on this basis without deference to reflective thought.  
Pre-empting recent studies in developmental psychology, Merleau-Ponty (1951) 
hypothesises that intercorporeality has powerful implications for child development. 
Moreover, the kind of embodied social knowledge that is facilitated by 
intercorporeality is not only developmentally crucial but remains an integral facet of 
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social understanding throughout one’s lifespan. Indeed, Legrand and Iacoboni 
(2006) claim “the most primary and concrete way to consider others' perspectives on 
the world is to consider others' motor accesses to the world”, a ‘consideration’ 
enabled by perceiving the other’s body in action, the meaning of which is intuitively 
grasped.  
Of course, this ‘consideration’ should not be construed as a conscious act of 
interpretation on the part of the observer, but rather as (ap)perceiving the other’s 
motor-intentionality as it emerges automatically during face-to-face interactions. 
Even modifications in the brain’s response to non-human objects materialise upon 
the recognition that it exists ‘for-the-other’, particularly when the agent perceives 
intentionally-directed human action. As demonstrated in canonical neuron research, 
neurophysiological responses to three-dimensional objects are modified whenever 
an observed party reaches for an object. The significance of reaching-to-grasp 
movements, as with most embodied actions, suddenly infuse the perceptual field 
with fresh meaning. As Merleau-Ponty’s states: “my gaze falls upon a living body 
performing an action and the objects that surround it immediately receive a new 
layer of signification” (1945/2012, p. 411).  
Perhaps for these reasons, Rizzolatti (2005) surprisingly claims: “mirror neurons do 
not have a specific, functional role”. That is, MNs inhabit a vast range of cortical 
brain regions, enabling the agent to understand, and even experience, a wide 
spectrum of phenomena. On this basis, MNs can arguably be seen as constitutive of 
not only intersubjectivity but of worldhood also. After all, witnessing the other’s 
comportment towards the world and interworldly objects transfers over to my 
understanding of those same phenomena whereby I become ‘locked in’ to a 
particular understanding of the world. Thus, MNs seemingly corroborate a sentiment 
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found among several phenomenologists who claim that we are thrown into a world of 
pre-established meanings and practices, and the contours of our engagement with 
the world are intimately connected with its presence as a place that is shared with 
others. 
IV. Combining Evidence 
Using research into the cognitive domain of empathy and MNs as a case example, 
we oversaw how combining phenomenological and neurophysiological evidence into 
a unified account aides the recognition of a cognitive domain’s constitutional 
structure. In several instances, appropriating phenomenological descriptions of 
empathy helped make sense of neurophysiological recordings obtained from 
participants engaged in emphasising acts. Three criteria are operative in establishing 
MNs as empathy-linked neurons: triggering conditions (MNs activate when agents 
observe intentional or expressive actions), spatial location (MNs activate in matching 
neural regions in observer and observed) and temporality (MN responses operate on 
a time-scale approximate to perception, not higher-order cognition). While the MN 
system is hypothetically expressible in physiological vocabulary, pursuing a 
comprehensive articulation of its so-called ‘cognitive correlate’, or even a functional 
account of its conditions of activation (e.g., how the brain registers intentionality from 
body-perception) motivated a leap into phenomenology. 
Integrating experimental data with phenomenological accounts of empathy was 
actualised through identifying phenomenological-neurophysiological convergence 
points in three key areas: ‘direct access’, ‘primacy’ and ‘embodiment’. Consequently, 
a model was obtained that illuminated empathy as a largely pre-theoretical, context-
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driven, and non-volitional act, enabled by an immediate understanding of the other’s 
mind by perceiving their body.  
Notably, the empirical findings’ theoretical implications independently corroborated 
pre-existing phenomenological accounts of empathy. Indeed, when faced with the 
challenge of articulating empathy’s conditions of possibility (a surely unavoidable 
task when expounding empathy-related neurons), the discoverers of MNs were, like 
Husserl, unsatisfied with the prevailing theories open to them (Iacoboni 2008). 
Indeed, presuming that empathy is defined by an intellectual process of mind-
reading runs counter to how empathy is given in experience and, now, in certain 
experimental data also.  
The lack of an appropriate operational definition for MN-related empathy perhaps 
retroactively substantiates Husserl’s assertion that dubious presuppositions 
permeate scientific and philosophical reasoning, diminishing the investigator’s 
certainty that common-sense or even science should unfailingly serve as conceptual 
footholds. The compatibility between non-scientific, phenomenological descriptions 
of empathy with breakthrough neuroscientific discoveries arguably validates 
Husserl’s employment of the epoché, which allegedly enabled an intentional-object 
or intending-act to be given as an “originary presentive intuition”, free from such 
obscuring presuppositions.  
For Husserl, phenomenological evidence hinges on the correct intuition of a 
categorical experience’s underlying structure, with its contingent contents stripped 
away. If empathising is a categorical experience, characterised by an intentional-act 
of disclosing the other, its structure is amenable to an eidetic investigation. Husserl 
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labelled evidence provided in such a format ‘apodictic’, as it proposedly grounds any 
subsequent, contingent examples of the phenomenon in question.  
However, Husserl did not conflate apodicticity with self-transparency (Schmid 2001) 
and, later in his career, “explicitly endorses the fallibility of evidence and confirmation 
in the course of further investigation” (Berghofer 2018). Indeed, succeeding 
phenomenologists took different approaches to the question of empathy, though they 
largely remained within the gravitational pull of Husserl’s original investigations. As 
shown, several of those investigations proved useful in constructing a 
neurophenomenological model of empathy.  
Finally, as a discipline that utilises philosophical argumentation, phenomenological 
analyses are entirely amenable to peer-review and intersubjective corroboration. 
Like scientific investigations, all phenomenological accounts are subjectable to 
criticism, amendment, expansion, reformulation and rejection. Taken thusly, 
phenomenology more closely resembles Sellars’ (1997, p. 79) construal of science 
as “a self-correcting enterprise, which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at 
once” than Sellars anticipated.   
V. Conclusion 
It should be noted that, at the levels of both brain and experience, a C-NP model 
should seek to apply to human beings generally, (provided they possess a brain). To 
successfully legitimise a C-NP model, a discernible neurological profile should co-
extend with an identifiable phenomenological profile, i.e., the presence of MNs 
should be consistent with universal (not ephemeral) empathic experiences. Mirror 
neurons are informative of empathy’s constitutive structure because they are 
detectable constituents of the brain and not just the brains of some experimental 
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subjects. A neurophenomenological model is therefore vulnerable if, at the structural 
level, empathic experiences fluctuate incoherently. Indeed, the field of 
neurophysiology often operates on the assumption that its findings are generally 
replicable across the population, which suggests that neurophenomenology should 
operate on somewhat analogous principles.  
Thus, it is the form of experience and not experience’s contingent contents that a C-
NP model seeks, where possible, to reveal.16 The specific, embodied practices a 
sole individual acquires may be biographically and culturally contingent, but the 
structural foundations scaffolding their ability to learn, enact and recognise 
meaningful practices seemingly remains uniform across individuals.17 Bodily pairing, 
for example, can assume innumerable outer manifestations, transverse a range of 
contexts, and transpire between countless empirical individuals (content); yet, 
structurally, it is by definition always constituted by an automatic synchronisation of 
bodily motor-intentionality between two or more minded bodies (form).   
Finally, as a neuroscientific model, C-NP should pursue external validity by supplying 
a useful operational definition to interrelated research programmes, including clinical 
psychology, pedagogy and primatology. A C-NP model of empathy helps 
researchers determine what exactly empathy ‘is’ by revealing its structural 
components on both a phenomenological and neurological basis. Thus, 
phenomenological analyses of experience offer a much more substantive window 
onto neural functionality (and its ‘cognitive’ correlates) than what is offered by 
introspective accounts provided by untrained subjects. Thus, we can perhaps agree 
 
16 Although Heidegger might claim that it is in the ‘content’, not the ‘form’, where the most revelatory 
information resides. 
17 Moreover, individual differences the MN-empathy relationship correspond to a pattern; individuals 
with higher MN activation are more empathic (Pfeifer et al. 2008). 
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with Heidegger (1925/1992, p.71) in that “constituting does not produce in the sense 


















Chapter 4: Applying the Findings 
Part 1 
How might the paradigmatic cases of neurophenomenological research analysed 
above showcase how neurophenomenology can inform the neurosciences in a more 
general sense? Here, we will assess how adopting a neurophenomenological 
approach or utilising findings from neurophenomenology in other research 
programmes can inform: a) the interpretation of evidence and b) the construction of 
experimental designs. To accomplish this, we will discuss some prominent and 
commonly used means of assessing validity in neuroscientific practice and 
investigate how the application of neurophenomenological methods and/or results 
might inform their evaluation.  
Specifically, we will focus on ecological validity, content validity and construct 
validity. It should be underscored that phenomenology’s contributions to 
neuroscientific practice are not unsolicited and unrequited overtures. While tensions 
and divergences between phenomenology and neuroscience undoubtedly exist, if 
neurophenomenology can be legitimatised as a neuroscientific sub-discipline, it is 
because it promotes the resolution of problems already identified by neuroscience.  
I. Ecological Validity 
In Heidegger’s (1952/1977) essay ‘Science and reflection’, Heidegger argues that 
scientific naturalism conceals as much as it reveals due to its need to establish linear 
causality and conflate the “real” with the “factually certain”. Perhaps this insight is 
especially incisive when scientific realism places ‘mind’ under its microscope. To 
succeed, a psychological experiment must isolate particular facets of cognition, 
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define them as variables and subject them to experimental manipulations. The 
‘horizon’ or ‘background’ that interest phenomenologists are too multifaceted for 
inclusion in any singular experimental design, as individual cognitive acts must be 
parsed apart and studied in relative isolation from each other. Consequently, 
cognitive neuroscience risks treating psychological phenomena as detached 
processes devoid of relation to wider experience, while phenomenologists often 
emphasise that extracting mental events from their meaning-giving background risks 
presenting them in a distorted format. 
This sentiment is well-articulated by Fuchs (2002): “on the phenomenological level, 
there is nothing like a “mental event” that could be isolated from the world and the 
stream of conscious experiences”. However, scientific psychology echoes an 
analogous criticism, recognising that the laboratory setting may impair the ecological 
validity of the phenomenon studied. Eyseneck & Keane (2015, p.5) define ecological 
validity as “the extent to which laboratory findings are applicable to everyday life”. By 
implication, mental events embedded in their ‘everyday’ setting somehow 
approximate their ‘true’ expression. Unlike a photon or kidney, the psychological 
variable (engaging a task, understanding the other) is difficult to genuinely 
understand through experimental investigation unless some effort is made to ‘re-
home’ it.  
Ecological validity may be impaired if a ‘mental event’ or ‘cognitive domain’ is 
stripped of the qualities that initially framed its study as worthwhile. Consequently, 
we no longer measure the phenomenon ‘in itself’ but rather a manipulatable variable 
without a clear existence beyond the laboratory. As Heidegger would agree, the 
restrictions imposed by the scientific method are not only contingent, frustrating by-
products, but necessary and ineliminable conditions of its success. The separation of 
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a mental event from global context, while crucial for obtaining a calculable result, 
presents a considerable challenge for ecological validity. Thus, the experimental 
psychologist committed to reinserting psychological phenomena back into their 
meaningful context has two choices: alter the experimental design or utilise 
theoretical supplementation.  
As discussed, Iacoboni (2006) notes several examples where the inclusion of global 
context promoted an astute interpretation of experimental results or influenced an 
experimental design. For instance, understanding why canonical neurons alter their 
activity when intentional actions are directed towards objects was augmented by 
suspending the assumption that ‘object’ and ‘other’ occur in entirely separate 
domains, sub-served by sequestered neural pathways. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty 
(1945) argued that the classical conception of body schema was impaired insofar as 
it omitted the patient’s world-directedness; that is, how worldly tasks shape the 
contours of the schema. This inclusion helped contextualise Schneider’s aberrant 
behaviour.  
Moreover, applying a particular phenomenological account to a specific experimental 
protocol might help researchers recognise specific ecological validity flaws. Imagine 
a psychologist studying intersubjective emotion who presents participants with 
photographs of people who will generate strong emotional reactions. Drawing on 
Husserl’s phenomenological distinction between signitive and pictorial perception, a 
commentator can argue that there is an important distinction between photograph-
perception and person-perception, a distinction possibly reflected in the brain’s 
response. Receding to a broader scope, we might argue that Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty persuasively showcase that the way that intentional-objects present 
themselves to the agent are heavily influenced by the agent’s capacity to interact 
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with them. This is a factor that is difficult to replicate in neuroimaging experiments 
where participants must remain stationary.  
If the gulf between a cognitive domain’s laboratory-induced expression and its 
‘everyday’ expression appears unbridgeable, the experiment is vulnerable on 
grounds of ecological validity. However, it appears evident that many central facets 
of normative phenomenological research will undoubtedly translate poorly to the 
experimental setting. Therefore, some research initiatives may be appropriate for a 
purely phenomenological or neuroscientific investigative approach. An agent’s 
historicity, for example, represents an incredibly important dimension for 
understanding the entity psychologists call ‘mind’; yet, it is difficult to conceive how 
this notion could survive a transition to the logic of experimental psychology without 
being disfigured in the process. 
In sum, both neurophenomenologists and experimental psychologists suggest that 
articulating the ‘genuine’ manifestation of human consciousness, as defined by its 
manifestation in “everyday life” instead of as an experimental variable, represents 
the real aim of a research programme. The psychologist or cognitive neuroscientist 
therefore endeavours to replicate the essential nature of a psychological 
phenomenon as an authentic, environmentally-grounded and multifaceted entity from 
within the laboratory or rectify any paucity through theoretical supplementation.  
Harnessing phenomenology helps researchers have a greater idea of the form that 
ecological validity flaws might take, while treating failures in ecological validity as 
surmountable problems mean that they are easier to mitigate at the levels of design 
and interpretation. Greater cognisance of the ways ecological validity can be found 
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lacking thus increases the likelihood that effective measures can be taken to 
reintroduce ecological validity into neuroscientific practice.  
II. Construct Validity 
Whether experimental neurophenomenology retains pertinent ecological information 
regarding the phenomenon it studies is unclear; indeed, as an experimental design 
dependent on neuroimaging, E-NP is unambiguously confined to the laboratory.18 
Nonetheless, E-NP’s methodological approach might be well-suited to certain 
research initiatives in which a type of measurement validity known as ‘construct 
validity’ might otherwise be called into question. Construct validity evaluates the 
degree of compatibility between a measurement tool and the phenomenon under 
investigation. While the experimental epoché, the main tool wielded by E-NP, should 
be subject to its own independent assessment of construct validity, what interests us 
here is how employing E-NP’s protocol might benefit specific research programmes 
in which issues in construct validity might otherwise arise.  
An essential precept in E-NP’s epistemological stance is that quantifying the 
phenomenological data is deemed tantamount to reducing its descriptive and 
diagnostic power. Several well-known measurement tools require that the ‘first-
person’ information supplied by subjects undergo quantification according to pre-
determined sub-scales. Such measures range from diagnostic assessments such as 
the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) to empathy measurements like the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). By contrast, Lutz and Thompson (2003) and 
Petitmengin et al. (2006) maintain that, when reporting the neuroimaging data’s 
 
18 However, patients did report alterations in their intentional relationship towards themselves and 
‘world’, which had apparently been missed by previous measures. 
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cognitive correlate, the terminology adopted must be expressive and conceptual 
rather than numerical and statistical. 
While some ‘orthodox’ approaches in the philosophy of science (such as the 
Corpusclian approach) dictate that quantitative items should ideally replace 
qualitative items in science (Harre 1976), the neurophenomenologist firmly rejects 
this injunction. Motivating this verdict is the belief that descriptive terminology 
approximates the nature of the thing studied. Put differently, numerical items do a 
worse job of cataloguing experience than descriptive items. It is precisely through the 
retention of descriptive language that the measurement tool (the epoché) aligns with 
the thing studied (experience).  
In clinical research, the importance of establishing congruence between 
measurement and construct is particularly significant, as the results derived from the 
study feed into therapeutic interventions. For instance, Petitmengin et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that the emergence of experiences categorised as “fragility” indicated 
the commencement of neural desynchronisation that precedes a seizure. It is difficult 
to conceive how translating this qualitative description into quantitive data would 
serve any practical aim for either patient or clinician. 
Nevertheless, an emphasis on expressive terminology alone may not distinguish E-
NP from alternative qualitative approaches. However, one distinctive attribute of the 
epoché is its capacity for formulating descriptive categories of experience to help 
localise patterns of neural activity that would otherwise be discarded as ‘noise’. 
Indeed, Lachaux (2011) suggests that careful attention to the content of first-person 
reports is the only feasible route to localising currently unrecognised neural 
signatures. To this end, Lutz and Thompson (2003) used three novel, epoché-
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acquired descriptions of anticipation to localise three novel patterns of neural activity. 
The Paris group reversed this sequence by guiding participants to attune themselves 
to experiences of which the neural correlate had already been established using 
EEG.  
Typically, however, assessing a protocol’s construct validity presupposes that 
researchers already possess an approximate knowledge of the thing investigated; 
this way, a verdict can be passed regarding the construct and the measurement 
tool’s compatibility. However, if the ‘construct’ remains improperly defined, or its very 
existence unconfirmed, a seemingly insurmountable obstacle stands in the way of 
developing an appropriate measure. Measurement tools are devised in accordance 
with current knowledge of a phenomenon, utilising information that must be 
comprised of more than a vague summation of its nature. However, the open-ended 
approach exhibited by the experimental epoché implies that a ‘construct’ with largely 
as-yet unknown properties can still be the object of experimental investigation. If a 
neurological profile is localised, the epoché can be employed to guide participants to 
achieve greater awareness of its experiential correlate, and vice versa.  
Furthermore, delineating specific profiles of cognitive activity from concurrent profiles 
represents a long-standing challenge in neuroscientific experimentation. We have 
spoken elsewhere of the general ‘holism’ of mind and brain and the problem this 
represents for the scientific method. For neuroscience in particular, parsing apart the 
various mental and neural events that overlap and entwine with each other has been 
described as the ‘individuation problem’ (Sullivan 2010).19 Richaud et al. (2017) 
claim: “if the experimental paradigm is insufficient for individuating [a] discrete 
 
19 In chapter 1, we saw how drawing inferences from neuropsychopathology is useful for 
distinguishing between capacities. 
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cognitive capacity, the data will be unreliable for discriminating among competing 
hypothetical claims”. As an investigative strategy, E-NP may be of utility here also. 
By guiding participants toward a circumscribed experiential profile, the experimental 
epoché aims to strip away the superfluous facets of the participant’s experience and 
triangulate the experiences pertinent to the investigation. If successful, the 
experiential data that is acquired should accurately reflect their neural correlate and 
can thus be individuated from other, co-occurring profiles which occupy the same 
temporal place. 
Therefore, whereas a more in-depth evaluation of the experimental epoché’s 
construct validity must fall to future researchers, a cursory analysis reveals that the 
epoché may represent a promising way to descriptively disclose experiential and 
neurological profiles when such profiles are imprecisely defined, or where they co-
occur with other, extraneous profiles that require careful individuation. However, the 
method employed in E-NP is relatively time-intensive. Therefore, to further support 
the epoché’s validity as a neuroscientific measure, future research must test how 
appropriate it is for various experiential profiles and seek ways of cross-validating the 
acquired data. 
III. Content Validity 
While a measurement tool may adequately cohere with the construct under 
investigation, it may nonetheless be found lacking regarding other forms of internal 
validity. One such example is ‘content validity’. In the cognitive sciences, content 
validity refers to the comprehensiveness of a measurement tool. If a measure 
accounts for all (realistically describable) features of the phenomenon in question, 
the criterion of content validity is satisfied. Thus, a measurement tool becomes 
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vulnerable to criticism on grounds of content validity if it is oblivious to important 
facets of the domain under investigation. For example, a proposed measure of 
intelligence that tests participants solely on their geographical knowledge is hindered 
by poor content validity: the measure fatefully neglects to test other determining 
factors of the domain under examination. Geographical knowledge could potentially 
represent one relevant factor in a person’s intelligence, but a measure that tests for 
little else cannot also be called a measure of intelligence; the complexity of the 
‘construct’ outstrips the sophistication of the measure. 
In the cognitive sciences, as knowledge of a cognitive domain (e.g., intelligence, 
agency, affect) is accumulated, measures become more receptive to fullness of its 
‘content’ and, thus, are able to test for such factors. To draw upon the analysis of 
empathy provided in chapter 3, if a measurement tool is blind to the embodied, non-
inferential and prereflective facets of empathy, the measurement’s ‘content validity’ 
might, on some accounts, be justifiably called into question. Here, the importance of 
astutely ‘operationalising’ our ‘construct’ (e.g., ‘empathy’) is evident, as an 
“operational definition is built directly into the design of an experimental paradigm” 
(Sullivan 2015). As argued above, operationalising empathy as a mental operation 
defined exclusively by an act of intending-the-other in a theoretical manner 
inadvertently concealed vital information regarding how the brain engages in social 
understanding in other cases. 
Thus, a measure cannot detect the full range of a cognitive domain’s expression if 
particular presuppositions impede the recognition of some of its defining elements. In 
certain cases, applying phenomenological descriptions to experimental data 
uncovers structural layers of a domain that may have been previously understudied. 
In turn, these insights can be worked into experimental designs which are then made 
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receptive to these newly discovered factors. For instance, a neurophenomenological 
analysis of mirror neurons supported the hypothesis that MNs would be sensitive to 
contextually-embedded intentional actions. Iacoboni et al. (2004a) tested this 
hypothesis by including environmental context in an experimental design, finding that 
MN responses were sensitive to environmentally congruent actions. Thus, a 
theoretical formulation of the subject matter flows downstream into experimental 
design, while an on-going process of knowledge accumulation determines how 
theoretically comprehensive the construct itself is. 
A paradigmatic example of content validity is known as ‘symptom correspondence’. 
Through interpreting neurophysiological data through a phenomenological lens, new 
ways of conceptualising symptoms become viable. However, it is erroneous to 
assume that all symptoms are surface visible. People with autism can display 
unambiguous empathy deficits, but interpretations of their cause differ. One 
theoretical model of empathy might speculate that the deficits lie in an inability to 
interpret another’s actions conceptually, which seemingly falls short of a complete 
picture. If empathy is (partially) constituted by a non-inferential understanding of 
intentionality achieved through perceiving actions, a diagnostic measure can (at least 
hypothetically) be developed to test for this ability’s (in)existence. 
Thus, the way that a cognitive domain is conceptualised has vital ramifications for 
the way measurement tools used to test it are constructed. A measure inclusive of 
the so-called ‘primordial’ ways in which agents engage in cognitive acts should help 
in the formulation of more comprehensive measurement tools. However, it should be 
noted that certain measures seem unlikely to benefit from incorporating 
neurophenomenological findings into their design. Questionnaires, for example, are 
ill-suited to measuring pre-reflective experience, as they actively target the 
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respondent’s reflective consciousness; it is, therefore, unclear how pre-reflective 
dimensions of experience could be incorporated into such a measure. However, 
research methods such as the interview and other qualitative and neuroimaging 
experimental designs may stand to benefit from the integration of 
(neuro)phenomenological research findings. 
IV. Summary  
From what we have observed, validity errors in the neurosciences appear more likely 
to emerge when pertinent information regarding the object of inquiry is overlooked or 
escapes a measurement tool’s ability to capture it. As discussed, a neuroscientific 
study’s validity might be impeded where the researcher unnecessarily quantifies first-
person data, excludes contextual factors or remains blind to important dimensions of 
the subject matter. Weaknesses in such areas of the experimental process may 
ultimately rise to the surface in the form of conceptual or theoretical flaws.  
Thus, neurophenomenological research findings might inform the design of 
measurement tools and experimental protocols as to better accommodate the object 
of investigation, even in protocols that are not explicitly neurophenomenological. In 
practice, a compromise must be negotiated whereby incorporating 
phenomenologically-derived notions work alongside the epistemological and 
procedural norms of the scientific method.  
It should be reiterated that not all neuroscientific research programmes stand to gain 
from phenomenological contribution, so it is crucial to attempt to systematise a way 
of detecting problems amenable to neurophenomenological methods or insights. 
Indeed, whether or not adopting a phenomenological approach is proper to the goal 
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pursued helps determine whether a phenomenological or non-phenomenological 




Phenomenology’s ‘point of insertion’ into neuroscientific practice is, to a large extent, 
determined by the specific requirements of the goal pursued. Outlining the optimal 
stage in normative neuroscientific practice where a phenomenological contribution 
might be appropiate helps to establish which kind of research topics should animate 
the sub-discipline. Indeed, the neurosciences already encompass a broad range of 
topics and methods. As such, neurophenomenology can lend a conceptual or 
methodological hand to the neurosciences in a variety of formats. From the three 
paradigmatic research programmes analysed above, which fundamental principles 
can be extracted to gain further clarity as to the compatibility between specific 
phenomenological tools and specific neuroscientific research initiatives?  
The foremost determining factor depends on the kind of neuroscientific protocol 
adopted. Neuropsychology places special emphasis on studying the relationship 
between brain, cognition and behaviour through examining neurological disorders. 
Cognitive neuroscience attempts to link theoretical accounts of cognition with 
experimental results targeting brain and behaviour (Standage and Trappenberg 
2012). More philosophy-heavy branches of neuroscience posit higher-order theories 
to (operationally) define a specific cognitive domain in the form of a large-scale 
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model by recruiting principles from other fields, such as evolutionary psychology or 
neuropsychoanalysis. 
In principle, neurophenomenology is equipped to fulfil each of these functions while 
adhering to the same standards of evidence operative in parallel neuroscientific 
approaches. Firstly, it should be reiterated that the cognitive-experiential dimension, 
the prime locus for any phenomenological contribution, is oftentimes an inseparable 
element of non-phenomenological neuroscientific practice. As Varela (1996) and 
Zahavi (2003) note, few neuroscientists are committed to the presumption that folk-
psychology, ordinary language or computational metaphors represent a boundless 
repository of descriptive terms for detailing the ‘cognitive correlate’. However, this 
does not condemn the neurophenomenologist to inevitably adopting a critical, 
‘outsider’ stance in juxtaposition with ‘normal’ neuroscientific practice. Nevertheless, 
the onus is on neurophenomenology to showcase how its own contributions are not 
easily replicated in parallel approaches. 
The three neurophenomenological approaches identified above synthesise 
phenomenological and neuroscientific evidence in different ways and at different 
junctures of the research process. Identifying how and where a 
neurophenomenological approach can strike its greater benefit will help underscore 
how neuroscience and phenomenology can be functionally integrated on a reliable 
and systematic basis. Therefore, further developing our taxonomy of 
neurophenomenological approaches should focus both on how the evidence is 
combined and, perhaps more importantly, to which end. Where phenomenology 
locates its ‘entrance’ into neuroscience ultimately hinges upon which of its 




II.i Interpretative Neurophenomenology  
In interpretative neurophenomenology, the phenomenological dimension is 
somewhat ‘inferred’ from what is provided, or indeed from what is absent, in an item 
of empirical literature. I-NP’s success hinges on its capacity to explicate critical 
elements of an empirical study’s research findings. The empirical evidence that I-NP 
interprets (the explanandum) may constitute a completely separate endeavour, with 
the neurophenomenologist acting as an independent adjudicator. Alternatively, the 
neuroscientist themselves may recruit phenomenological descriptions of experience 
to elucidate their own findings. Therefore, I-NP exerts the majority of its influence at 
the level of analysis rather than that of method. That is, while the experimental 
protocol or case study eschews incorporating phenomenology into its design, the 
study’s concrete results are elucidated and contextualised by cross-referencing them 
with phenomenological philosophy.  
In Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) analysis of Goldstein and Gelb’s case study, 
phenomenology exerted a two-fold influence. The first operated by reformulating a 
pre-existing psychological construct (body schema), while the second through 
(re)interpreting clinical findings that showcased the body schema in breakdown. 
Again, phenomenology exerted no influence over the original data collection; the 
diagnosis and behavioural assessments of patient Schneider were independently 
supplied. Merleau-Ponty’s main innovation lay in providing a fine-tuned ‘model’ of 
intentionality designed to contextualise, and thereby explain, Schneider’s 
symptomatology. The phenomenological distinction between the ‘lived’ and 
‘objective’ body, and the phenomenological notion of projection, found new life as 
neuropsychological explanations, purportedly through illuminating Schneider’s 
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pathological behaviours by articulating otherwise unnoticed distinctions in their 
intentional orientation. 
Similarly, Gallagher and Cole (1995) demonstrated how phenomenological accounts 
of intentionality can inform the interpretation of a neuropsychological case study. 
Gallagher (a phenomenologist) and Cole (a neuropsychologist) developed upon 
Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between body image and body schema in their 
assessment of I.W, a patient with severe proprioceptive deficits. As in Merleau-Ponty 
(1945), the symptoms were explained by recourse to a phenomenological analysis of 
motor-intentionality. The authors claimed that proprioceptive deficits differently 
affected both body image and body schema, with patient I.W supposedly substituting 
the former for the latter. In this instance, the ‘interpreters’ were closer to the source 
material than Merleau-Ponty, as Cole had personally interacted with and observed 
patient I.W in his capacity as a neuropsychologist, a factor which bodes well for this 
instance of I-NP research. 
Arguably, I-NP’s modus operandi extends even to instances where 
phenomenology’s contribution is unambiguous though relatively minute. For 
example, Costantini et al. (2011) operationalise the broad Heideggerian term ‘ready-
to-hand’ when labelling a distinction at the level of experience whereby the agent 
becomes newly receptive to an object’s affording-features during an experimental 
manipulation. Behaviourally and neurophysiologically, this transition is detectable 
with measures appropriate to those two domains. However, by describing the 
‘cognitive correlate’ with Heideggerian terminology, the transition becomes 
phenomenologically reportable also. Thus, phenomenology offers a suitable 
language for transcribing first-person experience where appropriate terms do not yet 
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exist, a function which may become increasingly necessary in light of the ever-
increasing sophistication of neuroimaging techniques. 
Strictly speaking, Costantini et al. (2011), did not incorporate phenomenology into 
their methodology; indeed, their results were publishable without mention of 
phenomenological terminology. However, because a phrase appropriate for 
describing a shift in the agent’s intentional comportment was necessary, the term 
‘ready-to-hand’ became seamlessly worked into the results’ conceptual 
interpretation. Thus, it is a prerequisite that the empirical findings interpreted by I-NP 
must be capable of standing on their own epistemic feet. With I-NP, phenomenology 
is restricted to performing an interpretative function, typically in the form of an 
appropriate language for conceptualising ‘consciousness’ (or better: the person-
world dynamic) in a way that approximates the nature of lived experience. As stated 
previously, adopting a mechanistic terminology may fail to confer the qualitative 
‘properties’ integral to experience. 
In sum, I-NP discloses one form of the relationship between phenomenology and 
neuroscience by showcasing how avenues of investigation established in one 
discipline (phenomenology) are effectively transferable to another (neuroscience). 
Could it be that phenomenologists and neuroscientists can labour quite 
independently on their own sets of problems, while some inherent commonality 
between them ensures the continuing prospect of a productive dialogue when the 
need arises?  
Indeed, several of Merleau-Ponty’s contributions to the Schneider case, that were 
also adopted in Gallagher and Cole (1995), originated in Husserl’s Ideas II. Unlike 
Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher, Husserl developed these ideas without much 
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knowledge of (or interest in) inquiries into brain-damaged patients. Yet, this mode of 
inquiry informed subsequent neuropsychological studies, indicating a commonality 
between the two disciplines that sometimes requires a little work to drag to the 
surface.  
I.ii Aligning I-NP with Research Programmes 
A discernible, and perhaps not coincidental, commonality in the above cases is that 
a pivot to phenomenological descriptions of intentionality informed the empirical 
results. Descriptive accounts of intentionality developed by phenomenologists 
appear especially conducive with certain post-experimental interpretations of 
neuroscientific results. One possible reason for this conduciveness is that 
phenomenology is adept at highlighting the deep, structural elements that constitute 
illuminating differences between both intentional-objects and acts-of-intending. 
Therefore, an emergent theme from the above analysis of I-NP is that this 
neurophenomenological approach is a suitable candidate when some kind of 
difference requires articulation.  
The investigative logic of psychological experimentation operates through 
manipulating particular variables and subsequently observing how said 
manipulations engender detectable differences in brain, cognition, and/or behaviour. 
It is certainly not unrealistic to imagine that important information concealed between 
experimental conditions is reportable in the language of intentionality. As Flanagan 
(1992) notes, one may be experientially insensitive to an object’s content but 
informationally sensitive to it. Moreover, the distinction between intending another 
person through memory or imagination, or intending an object as either a useful tool 
or three-dimensional entity, may be crucial to the interpretation of an experimental 
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result, yet the distinction may remain opaque until phenomenology renders it 
transparent. The dyadic relationship between the intentional-act and its intentional-
object seemingly structure the agent’s cognition in profound ways and can make 
otherwise confusing empirical data more comprehensible.  
Furthermore, a neuropsychological double dissociation is often viewed as puzzling 
because of the apparent similarity between behaviours that are retained compared to 
those that are lost. The “theoretical innovations” that scaffold neuropsychology 
(Marshall and McGurd 2010) derive from an aptitude for engaging in sometimes 
counter-intuitive (i.e., philosophical) forms of reasoning to render the dissociations 
intelligible through acts of conceptual contextualisation. Patients do not think and 
behave in a vacuum, so it is apparent to neuroscientists that cognitive-behavioural 
acts are structured according to a particular logic. However, successfully revealing 
this logic may oftentimes require the assistance of a methodology specifically 
designed for such a purpose (Martin 2005). 
Thus, revealing the mind’s ‘intentional logic’ could provide a vital clue to as to why, 
for example, a patient can remember faces but not imagine them. Similarly, 
detectable differences between clinical and non-clinical populations may be 
articulatable in phenomenological-intentional terms. We might interpret the difference 
between the depressed patient’s concept of self as ultimately an intentional 
difference. Moreover, other phenomena, including what phenomenologists call the 
‘background’, (that which structures the way intentional-objects show up) may 
represent a further conceptual tool useful for the interpretation of empirical results. 
Overall, it appears that I-NP should be sensitive to differences as they exist in 
empirical findings and assume the function of both detecting and contextualising 
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them. These ‘differences’ may designate those between behaviours, experimental 
conditions, between clinical subjects and controls or even in cases of intra-individual 
variability. In each instance, a theoretical explanation for an empirically observable 
variation requires articulation, sometimes inviting a radical reformulation of the core 
material. Thus, in clarifying the intentional-referent, and the structural components to 
acts-of-intending, cognition and behaviour are themselves further clarified. 
Consequently, a study’s empirical results may become easier to interpret and thus 
yield richer information. 
II.i Experimental Neurophenomenology 
Experimental neurophenomenology is not explicitly wedded to utilising 
phenomenology to explain neuroscientific data. Instead, E-NP generates novel 
phenomenological and neurological data in the format of a cognitive neuroscientific 
experiment. In acquiring the phenomenological data, E-NP employs an 
operationalised version of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, repurposed as a 
measure for accessing opaque or dormant dimensions of psychological (though not 
transcendental) experience. E-NP appropriates trace elements of Husserl’s 
transcendental-phenomenological reduction (i.e., an emphasis on immediate 
experience, suspension of theoretical ways of understanding phenomena) and 
exploits them toward the obtainment of subtle, categorical descriptions of 
experience.  
Notably, the experimental epoché’s purpose is not necessarily interchangeable with 
that of other qualitative measures. For instance, the subject’s explicit beliefs are not 
targeted with the epoché, and such data are perhaps better captured with more 
traditional measures. Ideally, the phenomenological datasets that are acquired either 
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facilitate the recognition of novel patterns of neural activity or serve as ‘purified’ 
forms of first-person data (e.g., preictal experience) that can be correlated with the 
study’s neuroimaging data. That is, the experiential profiles that E-NP acquires are 
demarcated from concurrent experiential profiles so as to be free of ‘confound 
experiences’, mirroring analogous concerns in neuroimaging procedures that are 
resolved through comparable means. 
In Petitmengin et al. (2006), the epoché enabled participants to access experiences 
characteristic of a circumscribed pattern of neural activity (desynchronisation 
surrounding the epileptic focus) that emerges prior to seizure onset. According to 
their analysis, this profile of neural activity had no pre-established experiential 
correlate, thereby justifying the employment of the epoché to measure it. Their 
findings were further supported by a validated prediction and the profitable 
application of their results to therapeutic measures, suggesting that supporting one’s 
research findings by pursuing external validation should be emulated by future 
adopters of E-NP. 
In Lutz and Thompson (2003), the experimental epoché generated 
phenomenological descriptions that were then codified and compared with data from 
simultaneous EEG recordings. This comparative analysis helped localise patterns of 
(otherwise uninterpretable) neural activity because the novel experiential categories 
correlated with a commensurate neurological signature. Apparently, then, E-NP’s 
capacity for disclosing novel neurological or phenomenological profiles operates 




Assuming this logic is correct, the experimental epoché represents a promising 
methodological candidate for ascertaining how newly-disclosed patterns of 
neurophysiological activity manifest in experience (and vice versa). Presumably, the 
experiential categories already uncovered by the epoché thus far are not exhaustive, 
and one might speculate to the existence of multiple neurological and 
phenomenological profiles that might become recognisable upon future application of 
the method. 
Thus, while most neuroscientific disciplines assume a relationship between brain and 
experience, this does not imply that, while neurological structures have to be actively 
discovered, experiential structures passively fall into the researcher’s lap. 
Approaching this same issue from a different angle, Hans and Northoff (2008) 
located the neural correlates of culturally-dependent experiences. We can infer from 
such findings that the neuroscientist’s ability to orient themselves in the uncertain 
terrain of neurophysiological data depends significantly on their possession of well-
defined experiential descriptors.  
Obtaining accurate descriptions of experience seemingly permit the recognition of 
neural modifications commensurate with them; while such a proposition is not unique 
to neurophenomenology, E-NP brings this notion to the foreground. However, it is 
prudent for the experimental neurophenomenologist to pursue external validation for 
their phenomenological findings, as phenomenological data are (arguably) more 
susceptible to accidental generalisation than neurophysiological data. 
II.ii Aligning E-NP to Research Programmes 
The nature of the epileptic seizure ensured that it could be neither stimulated nor 
manipulated during the experiment. Experimentalists cannot (or should not) exert 
116 
 
any direct influence over the seizure and, as such, it might be argued that the 
preictal stage was studied ‘in itself’, even in the laboratory setting. Despite featuring 
the structure of an experiment, E-NP is not necessarily anchored to the manipulation 
of experimental conditions as is required by some protocols. Therefore, unlike I-NP, 
E-NP may be suitable both for experiments that feature multiple conditions and for 
those that feature no experimental manipulations and instead measure an 
experiential phenomenon as it occurs ‘naturally’. 
Additionally, localising discrete patterns of neural activity and targeting their correlate 
with the epoché should, if possible, reveal first-person experiences as they are 
directly presented within the participant’s phenomenal field, not as they are 
represented in the form of beliefs and opinions. Overall, the epoché is useful for 
making sense of specific types of neurophysiological data that correlate with what 
might be called ‘non-conceptual’ (sensations/moods/affect) forms of cognition, rather 
than ‘conceptual’ (beliefs/theories/opinions) forms of cognition. 
Furthermore, that the epoché disclosed experiences characteristic of a clinical 
condition indicates that E-NP is likely suitable for disclosing relatively unusual forms 
of experience. Broadly speaking, certain pathological experiences are relatively 
demarcated from the rest of experiential life. This factor perhaps eases their 
recognition and lessens the likelihood that they are confused with ‘confound’ 
experiences. On this basis, hallucinations, manic episodes, dissociative experiences 
and similar pathological phenomena might be considered as prime candidates for an 
E-NP design.  
Additionally, what might be termed ‘experimentally-induced experiences’, such as 
those produced by trans-cranial magnetic stimulation or psychopharmacological 
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interventions might likewise be well-adapted to E-NP for similar reasons. However, 
inductions found between experimental manipulations may be equally adaptable to 
E-NP. For instance, one might utilise the epoché to investigate the experiential 
differences between intending an object as ready-to-hand and present-to-hand, as in 
Costantini et al. (2011). 
Finally, Petitmengin (2009) labelled the experiences characteristic of the preictal 
stage as both ‘micro-temporal’ and ‘pre-reflective’. These labels designate a realm of 
experiential phenomena that are of short duration or are largely inaccessible to 
conscious awareness, respectively. Consequently, these dimensions of experience 
may be routinely unrecognised in neuroimaging work. Experiences indicative of 
symptom onset can be said to fit these labels and are of significant clinical value. 
Because patients may have greater ‘executive control’ during the moments 
immediately preceding onset, the epoché might be employable as a clinical tool to 
help patients resist succumbing to their symptoms fully. Indeed, Petitmengin (2009) 
reports that one of the therapeutic interventions developed from their research had 
some success in this very area. Thus, finding an external point of reference to cross-
validate one’s findings, such as through applying them to therapeutic interventions, 
should be contemplated by E-NP’s adopters. 
III. Constitutive Neurophenomenology  
Like interpretative neurophenomenology, constitutive neurophenomenology provides 
conceptual support to existing empirical data. However, rather than illuminating a 
singular dataset, C-NP instead positions a broadly-defined ‘construct’ (elsewhere 
defined as ‘cognitive domain’) as its centre of gravity. By integrating complementary 
research findings from across phenomenology and neuroscience, the constitutive 
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neurophenomenologist aims to build a comprehensive picture of the domain 
investigated. If successful, one result of this procedure would be the creation of a 
positively framed model of the targeted construct, as articulated through recourse to 
its phenomenological and neurophysiological invariants. For instance, in chapter 3, 
we observed how combining several types of neurophysiological and 
phenomenological evidence permitted the hypothesis that empathy is, according to 
the logic of the C-NP model, an automatic, embodied, pre-theoretical act.  
While I-NP is tethered to explaining a specific set of empirical results, and E-NP to 
generating such results, C-NP has a greater license to make bolder claims in its 
pursuit of an operationalisation of the domain in question.20 It appears well-justified 
to claim that no single experiment is at liberty to assert what a cognitive domain 
actually ‘is’. Without further analysis, Merleau-Ponty’s reading of the Schneider case 
cannot lay claim to a comprehensive model of embodiment.21  
However, by expanding its borders to include several phenomenological, clinical, 
behavioural and neurophysiological research findings, C-NP can mould cognitive 
domain X into the shape of a theoretical model. Modelling a cognitive domain 
according to some of its structural properties has important, large-scale ramifications 
for neuroscientific practice and adjacent disciplines, as “models allow us to explore 
the system-level consequences of experimental observations” (Craver and Kaplan 
2014). 
Accordingly, C-NP is not hostile to alternative neuroscientific models of the same 
construct. Indeed, C-NP models must remain relatively modest in their ambitions and 
 
20 An operational definition enables researchers to define and use a term (e.g., empathy) in a certain 
way.  
21 However, elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology could be labelled as a ‘C-NP’ approach. 
119 
 
receptive to alternative models that originate from parallel approaches. An 
evolutionary or psychoanalytic model can productively disclose alternative features 
of the very same domain (i.e., empathy), perhaps by reference to empathy’s 
phylogenetic origins or the unconscious motivations behind empathising acts. Thus, 
C-NP is best conceived of as a lens through which otherwise opaque features of 
brain and experience can be made mutually explicable. As a theory-heavy approach, 
C-NP’s claims are subject to the same standards of justification as in comparable 
neuroscientific models and must walk a tightrope between successfully extracting a 
theory from heterogeneous forms of evidence while avoiding excessively broad and 
bold claims. 
Treating C-NP as a model-building exercise that follows a relatively standardised 
methodological procedure suggests that commonly shared features between 
different neurophenomenological models will likely emerge. Despite divergences in 
accounts provided by various phenomenologists, there is little warrant to denying the 
existence of emergent themes within the phenomenological canon. Among them, 
one may include what Husserl terms ‘pre-theoretical consciousness’ or what 
Heidegger terms ‘primordiality’; roughly speaking, the way that agents engage their 
world as it is given directly and non-conceptually before reflective thought takes grip. 
On this basis, we might suggest that C-NP models should be capable of passing a 
‘face’ assessment, a cursory evaluation that indicates whether it is genuinely 
phenomenological by evaluating the claims that it makes. 
For example, if a neurophenomenological model of language operationalises 
language as a reflective act of consciousness that manipulates linguistic symbols 
solely for the purpose of functional communication, it may raise doubts whether this 
approach should be called phenomenological at all. Consequently, we might argue 
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that other neuroscientific models are better suited for articulating the reflective 
aspects of human consciousness (and its neural correlates) and, as such, should be 
utilised accordingly.  
Therefore, one possible role for C-NP is that of articulating how the brain 
immediately understands (or better: engages) the world before reflective 
consciousness takes hold as its prominent modality of world-engagement. More 
specific detail regarding how the agent engages the world (i.e., through memory, as 
a temporally-situated being, etc.) can serve as a principle of classification for the 
cognitive domain under investigation (i.e., memory, temporality, etc.). 
Thus, accurately and systematically articulating a cognitive domain’s cognitive-
experiential dimension should reliably indicate how neurological and experiential 
structures relate to each other in a consistent fashion. The contingent, empirical 
experiences of single individuals, if only contained within those individuals 
themselves, are of a reduced interest to C-NP. Instead, a cognitive domain’s neuro-
phenomeno-logical structure is viewed as something that is discovered, not 
constructed, much in-line with Heidegger’s (1925/1992) early view of constitution. 
Translating this principle over to the cognitive sciences, we face the idea that 
phenomenological inquiry can lay claim to foundational characteristics of ‘mind’ in 
the shape of a theoretical model. 
III.iii Aligning C-NP to Research Programmes 
The topics addressed by C-NP should approximately map onto the broad areas of 
specialisation within psychology and neuroscience (what may be found as chapter 
headings in an undergraduate textbook): memory, language, perception, attention, 
and so forth. Conducting this type of research might begin by simply selecting a 
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cognitive domain and conducting a cross-disciplinary literature review. A 
neurophenomenological investigation into a cognitive domain, targeting, for instance, 
‘spatiality’, ‘mood’ or ‘agency’, might commence by defining its subject matter from 
the bottom-up through careful attention to its phenomenological and 
neurophysiological characteristics and the ways in which they intersect. 
Alternatively, as previously suggested, a neurophysiological discovery (e.g., MNs) 
might motivate a re-examination of the phenomenological literature as to 
operationally define a cognitive domain in accordance with new evidence. 
Historically, the earliest indications that a C-NP approach may be viable emerge 
when the theoretical implications of an empirical discovery appear conducive with an 
existing phenomenological account of a related topic. This initial compatibility spurs a 
renewed inquiry into a circumscribed domain and permits exploitable opportunities to 
rise to the surface. Recall that the discovery of mirror neurons led their discoverers 
to reject the prevailing operational definition of empathy because it appeared 
theoretically incompatible with the neurophysiological data. Gallese (2011) indicated 
that a comparable approach is likely viable with regards the discovery of 
peripersonal neurons. 
Thus, C-NP targets a broad region of cognition-experience and investigates what its 
conditions of possibility are, culminating in a theoretical model that conceptualises its 
subject matter according to what might cautiously be termed ‘phenomenological 
principles’. For example, Schiavio (2012) offers an operational definition of ‘music’ 
outside of what she argues is the somewhat limited conception provided by 
mainstream psychology, appropriating accounts provided by Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty to accomplish her goal. For example, she cites operational definitions of music 
as a “unidirectional stream coming from the environment”, or as a modern equivalent 
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to a mating ritual (as claimed by evolutionary psychologists; see Miller 2000) as 
unsatisfying for providing a comprehensive account of music. 
By redefining musicality under a phenomenological lens, Schiavio reconceptualises 
“the musical object” by highlighting the importance of musical affordances, motor-
intentionality and the integration between the musician and the musical performance. 
Reformulating the “musical object” is here central to the investigative strategy 
pursued and Schiavio’s account is constructed to complement several instances of 
empirical data, thus allowing a phenomenological conceptualisation of musicality to 
become visible to neuroscientific investigation; indeed, Schiavio even designates her 
goal as “constituting the musical object”. In this instance, Schiavio purportedly 
reveals the cognitive domain of musicality’s constitutive structure by positioning its 
neurophysiological and phenomenological structures into a mutually explanatory 
relationship. 
Furthermore, a C-NP account of a singular cognitive domain may assume several 
forms. Several authors have conceptualised temporality on a 
neurophenomenological basis, yet each model was provided in a slightly different 
format. Among them, Lloyd (2012) and Dorato and Wittmann (2020) highlight how an 
existential model of temporality provides fresh insights into how the brain engages 
time. On a different note, Varela (1999a) utilised Husserl’s tri-partite structure of the 
present moment to understand the temporal structure of brain functionality generally. 
Elsewhere, however, Varela (1999b) adopted a Heideggerian account of temporality 
which alters the kind of neuroscientific evidence adopted into the model. Seemingly, 
then, C-NP can operationally define the cognitive domain ‘temporality’ quite 
heterogeneously and model the relationship between brain and time in a variety of 
equally acceptable formats.  
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Finally, a C-NP model must present some capacity in which its claims are falsifiable 
and amicable to modification in the face of new evidence. Moreover, where possible, 
C-NP should seek to support its claims by pursuing traditional forms of external 
validity; that is, by applying its operational definitions to areas of research known to 
adopt neuroscientific models for well-defined research purposes. Such areas include 
psychiatry, psychotherapy, developmental psychology, education, AI research and 
animal cognition research. By showcasing a unique way of conceiving a cognitive 
domain from the ground-up through the assimilation of phenomenological and 
neuroscientific evidence, several of the disciplines that circle the social and cognitive 
sciences stand to benefit from the unique kinds of theoretical models and operational 













An initial literature review observed that the field of neurophenomenology, while 
constituting a single disciplinary genus, encompassed a heterogeneity of diverse 
research methods. Indeed, researchers had often invoked the term 
‘neurophenomenology’ in a blanket sense without adequate specification as to which 
procedural techniques were recruited or how the challenge of integrating 
phenomenological and neuroscientific evidence was surmounted.  
To bring these issues to the foreground and refine their ambiguity, the discipline of 
neurophenomenology was sub-divided into three distinctive approaches. It was 
suggested that the most parsimonious way of classifying each approach was to 
underscore its telos. I-NP aims to elucidate independent evidence from the 
neurosciences by utilising phenomenological resources. E-NP generates 
phenomenological and neurophysiological data in tandem by implementing a specific 
experimental protocol. C-NP aims to theoretically model a broadly-defined cognitive 
domain by revealing its neurophysiological and phenomenological structural 
invariants. 
Each category in this tripartite taxonomy represents a commonly-adopted, yet 
previously unclassified, methodological instantiation of neurophenomenology. In 
establishing this classification, we examined three separate methodological 
configurations in which phenomenological and neuroscientific evidence were 
productively synthesised towards a circumscribed research goal. An in-depth 
examination of three paradigmatic research initiatives, treated as emblematic of their 
respective categories, enabled us to extract guiding principles regarding each 
approach’s internal logic, likely conditions of success and potential weaknesses. 
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These principles were deemed to apply to other research initiatives that occupy the 
same methodological category, and it was further suggested that their approach to 
evidencing their claims should, with some qualifications, be emulated by future 
researchers. 
Furthermore, it was argued that not every neuroscientific research initiative is 
cohesive with each neurophenomenological approach, a reality that was partially 
concealed by the oft-imprecise usage of ‘neurophenomenology’. It was proposed 
that, by clarifying which research goals are concomitant with each approach, future 
adopters of neurophenomenology will be able to better co-ordinate their research 
efforts. Additionally, we analysed how appropriating findings from all three 
neurophenomenological approaches might inform non-phenomenological forms of 
neuroscientific research, i.e., through the adoption of operational definitions. Thus, 
researchers who do not explicitly adopt neurophenomenology might nevertheless 
profit from its discoveries.  
Taking stock of the diverse neurophenomenological approaches currently available 
and rendering their epistemological and methodological distinctions transparent 
might help to further establish neurophenomenology as an effective research option. 
Indeed, Gallagher and Varela (2003) already suggested that the 
neurophenomenological enterprise’s success hinges on the astute categorisation of 
fertile areas for cross-disciplinary investigation. While some of the promising 
thematic areas of investigative convergence have been well-articulated elsewhere, 
less effort had been placed on extending this categorisation process to 
epistemological areas of convergence. Indeed, if Varela’s neurophenomenology is in 
fact a “methodological remedy”, a more pronounced emphasis on 
126 
 
neurophenomenology’s methodological and epistemological composition was a 
timely contribution. 
Subsequent research into the epistemology of neurophenomenology may potentially 
find it pertinent to further sub-divide the tripartite taxonomy offered here to feature a 
greater level of nuance. For instance, a neurophenomenological research 
programme might adopt an experimental design, yet not recruit the operationalised 
epoché as a measurement tool. Alternatively, further scrutiny might be afforded to 
the specific kind of empirical data that I-NP interprets, highlighting the difference 
between experimental protocols and case studies.  
In the 25 years that have passed since Varela inaugurated the field of 
neurophenomenology, the notion that ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ accounts of mind 
are irreconcilable has, arguably, increasingly lost currency the cognitive sciences. 
Indeed, the present analysis evaluated several instances in which evidence from 
both disciplines were positioned into a mutually illuminating explanatory relation. 
Having expounded some of the ways in which neuroscience and phenomenology 
can be jointly recruited in the service of a shared goal, the theoretical and 
epistemological terrain of neurophenomenology has, hopefully, been mapped out in 
greater detail. Charting this map to an increased level of sophistication shall likely be 
the by-product of further theoretical exposition as well as the continued accumulation 
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